This fascinating paper distinguishes between two spheres of science:
-academic, governed by prestige for public knowledge disclosure;
-technological, governed by money derived from secret knowledge
However, a puzzle: my field has no well-developed field of “technology”!
🧵
-academic, governed by prestige for public knowledge disclosure;
-technological, governed by money derived from secret knowledge
However, a puzzle: my field has no well-developed field of “technology”!
🧵
The paper offers no clear guidance about what would happen in such a field. I’m not sure either but I have some speculations based on what I think technology does for science as a whole.
1. A technological arm of a field creates pressure for research to “work”
1. A technological arm of a field creates pressure for research to “work”
If a firm relies on research that doesn’t work, another firm could develop research that does and put the non-competitive firm out of business.
This pressure is not so strong in academic research because rewards accrue to *discovery claims*, not to inventions that “work”
This pressure is not so strong in academic research because rewards accrue to *discovery claims*, not to inventions that “work”
2. A technological arm incentives trainees to make their work diagnostic of skill in technology.
This paper describes how the technology sector benefits from academia because good academic products can signal a skilled trainee
This paper describes how the technology sector benefits from academia because good academic products can signal a skilled trainee
This is why trainees might stay in academia until they reach the postdoc stage — the postdoc stage is when the best trainees can send an honest signal about their skill for work in technology & secure a high paying job in technology
3. A technological arm helps absorb excess labor from academia.
The supply of academic labor has long far outstripped available academic positions because academics use trainees as skilled, low-cost labor
The supply of academic labor has long far outstripped available academic positions because academics use trainees as skilled, low-cost labor
This is ok as long as trainees can jump to other careers without too much respecialization. When trainees must bear large costs to respecialize, the system becomes highly inefficient
The above are speculations, but I think they fit my observations about my field (social psych). Social psych researchers face enormous pressures to make discovery claims, but few pressures to make research that “works”
Trainees also face pressures to make a CV that conforms to academic expectations of what’s good, but almost no pressure to signal value to industry
Meanwhile there is an enormous supply of academic labor, many of whom must bear large costs themselves to respecialize for other jobs when academic positions are not forthcoming
I’ll be thinking about this more. I think there are some implications here for academic training & field-wide patterns of reproducibility
