Thread by @JustSayXtian

Okay - over the past week or so we've dealt with some outright regressive bits of Talmud in the Daf Yomi cycle, and I have Some Thoughts. This stuff can be difficult, because it's hard to reconcile loving our tradition with modern, progressive values

#DafYomi

There an impulse I see, and that I've felt, to try to find ways to rationalize the bits that don't fit with what we understand as ethical and moral Good. A desire to find a clever way that it actually really means something else, if you can find the right bit of nuance or context

I've come to distrust that impulse. I don't think it's honest, and I don't think it achieves the thing I'm trying to do - it doesn't address the problematic parts, it just brushes them over or rationalizes them.

The fact of the matter is that most - maybe all - of the sages and scholars that gave us the rich gift of the Talmud had capital-P Problematic opinions on a lot of things. Especially women. Also gay people. Et cetera. I don't want to deny that, and I don't want to excuse it.

They were a product of their time, sure, but I don't think that's an excuse for them any more than it was for our grandparents. Any person, of any generation, had the ability to look around and say "hey, this is wrong." That they didn't do that is a failure of compassion.

But - BUT - I don't think that means we throw out the teachings, and I don't think it means we have to excise the problematic parts. There is still valuable, compassionate, loving stuff in there, even if the surface has a big ick factor.

In Berakhot 6b we learned that the primary reward for studying Talmud is in learning the logical analysis, not the halakhic conclusions. And indeed, it's not the best source for practical halakha. Understandings have changed over time, decisors have decided, the world has grown.

So I think there is value in studying even the parts that might make us cringe in order to learn the analysis, so that we can draw our own, more compassionate and progressive conclusions.

In Berakhot 43b, the sages list things that are disgraceful for a Torah scholar - among them going out perfumed to the marketplace (because people might think he's a homosexual) and conversing with women in the marketplace (because people might think he's promiscuous).

Both pretty cringe-worthy. But reading on, every one of these things gets elaboration. The elaboration doesn't actually counteract the homophobia and misogyny, that's still there, but it does get to the core of *why* these things are forbidden.

For every one of them, it's made clear that the important thing is not what the scholar does, but how it is *perceived*. It's a system for making sure that one doesn't give the impression that they are less respectable and trustworthy than they actually are.

The core reasoning is that one who is taking on the mantle of a respected position in the community needs to be mindful of what is being modeled and their own reputation. And that's a good thing to remember. Be the thing you want to see your community become.

Personally, I want my community to be welcoming to diversity in sexual and romantic orientation and gender identity and expression. By breaking the *specific* prohibitions, I believe I'm actually *following* the logical reasoning of conduct becoming a student of Torah.

I'm striving to conduct myself in a way that models the values I hold for my community, and that presents the reputation I want to have in the world - and I literally can't do that without talking to, and learning from, women in the marketplace, among other things.

In Berakhot 47b, the Gemara states that women, slaves and minors are not counted in a minyan - and then it starts to make exceptions. Slaves do count in a minyan in certain circumstances. Some minors can count. Maybe even babies. An ark can count in a pinch.

But, notably, no exception is listed for women. A question is raised in a specific example of a slave being freed in order to form a minyan, asking how that can be permitted in circumstances where freeing the slave is itself an act forbidden by the Torah (whole other problem set)

The answer given is, to my mind, profound:

A mitzvah that benefits the many is different.

Following a commandment, or taking action that allows for a commandment to be followed by the many permits the breaking of a commandment that does not benefit the many.

The good of the community outweighs the following of individual restrictions. So why didn't the rabbis explicitly extend this to permit the counting of women in a minyan? I would guess they thought that wouldn't be better for the community to do so.

Whatever they thought, though, I know for sure that my communities are made stronger by the presence of women. My community is better with women equally involved and respected. The underlying lesson - the good of the community outweighing individual prohibitions - applies.

I don't think we have to whitewash the sages and try to unmake their flaws and shortcomings. It isn't necessary, because they gave us the tools we need to get at the good stuff. The primary benefit is in the analysis. The good of the many outweighs individual strictures.