Over the past week, Turkey has moved hundreds of tanks and other heavy military equipment as well as reportedly thousands of troops into northwestern Syria, where more than half a million people are on the run from a Russian and Iranian backed loyalist advance. A few thoughts: /1
Ergodan earlier this week gave the Syrian regime until the end of February to withdraw behind Turkish posts along the so-called "Sochi line." Loyalists had previously ignored and circumvented, and sometimes even shelled the Turkish forward positions, leaving them besieged. /2
Interpretations of the Turkish moves run the gamut: Many see in Turkey the only force capable of stopping a regime offensive that is quickly devolving into the worst atrocity of a horrific war. One that could set off another mass exodus of millions and radicalize a generation. /3
Those cautiously optimistic about Ankara holding the line note that the build-up of Turkish forces is unprecedented in scale and quality. They also point out that Erdogan has staked considerable political capital and has in the past followed up on similarly explicit threats. /4
Others are skeptical, noting that the outcome in Idlib hinges above all on the balance between Russia and Turkey - in which Moscow, having backed the Assad regime to the heel, finds itself in an advantageous position vis-a-vis everyone, leaving Turkey to deescalate repeatedly. /5
They suggest that the likeliest outcome is a slow "managed" collapse. In which loyalist forces push ever further into northwestern Syria, while Turkey blusters to save face before inevitably backing down. In this scenario, the millions of civilians caught in the pocket ... /6
... would crowd into a narrow, densely populated, underdeveloped strip along the border with overflow into Turkish-held areas in northern Aleppo. Under pressure, many civilians would eventually cross the line and surrender to loyalists as seen e.g. in southern Syria in 2018. /7
I would be skeptical of anyone without direct access to the higher echelons of Turkish policy to make a call on this. Turkish intelligence officials in meetings with rebel commanders had certainly been briefing a gloomy outlook in recent weeks, but decisions are made up top. /8
Some of the factors: How does Turkey weigh the potential of mass refugee influx against the risk of escalation against Russia? Would the border hold if hundreds of thousands of desperate civilians pressed against it? What does domestic opinion say about another adventure? /9
For Russia: How much does it value its relationship with Turkey in and outside of Syria (i.e. splitting NATOs southern flank vs the desire to bring the Syrian conflict to an irreversible close)? Does military victory make European investment in Syria more or less likely? /10
Fundamentally: What is the military and diplomatic balance between the two powers, how do they value the outcome in Idlib and thus who retains escalation dominance in the area? A lot of these questions have no objective answer but depend on elite perceptions and timelines. /11
The past may be a bad guide. Turkey has been messaging for years that there were lines in Idlib beyond which it would consider military options (I heard officials use the words "casus belli" in the presence of Russian counterparts), but that it preferred mutual settlements. /12
It has repeatedly failed to deter or punish loyalist attacks beyond the agreed "Sochi line" without, however, ever ceding the principle of the agreement, leading to the awkward and dangerous situation leaving Turkish troops besieged in now-pointless observation points. /13
The extended timeline of three weeks makes Erdogan's ultimatum an interesting gamble. Previously, most notably the northeast, the regime has been able to rely on Russia to back it to the heel against Turkish forces, disrupting Ankara's plans. Assad is gain unlikely to fold. /14
Finally, external powers have little to say at this point. The State Department sees an opening to rebuild its ties to Ankara and has expressed support for Turkish moves. But the Pentagon and others remain skeptical. The intervention in northeast Syria burnt a lot of bridges. /15
In Europe, there is only marginal fear of another refugee crisis. On top of its invasion of eastern Syria, Turkey also made enemies in the eastern Mediterranean and Libya. Finally, there is an unprecedented degree of cynicism among Syria hands reg things that could be done. /16
I don't know what's going to happen. I am on record as a cynic, but still, I pray that Erdogan upholds his threat. It will create an unprecedented liability for Turkey and its army but it will also avert the single greatest atrocity in war of the still-young 21st century. /17
PS: I haven't had the time to go into the whole air superiority thing. Again, a lot of variables. Turkey firing at Russian jets remains unimaginable. Everything short of that may be on the table. Some analysts are making clean-cut calls based on this. I think that's premature.
