The US Army six-mule wagon of the Civil War could carry 2,800 pounds of goods and travelled at the rate of 2.5 mph. Each regiment was allotted six wagons, managed by the quartermaster officer, with inventories & load plans for each. A division averaged about 342 vehicles.
GO 152, Aug 9, 1862: "Ammunition wagons will be distinguished by a horizontal stripe, 6 inches wide, painted on each side of the cover - for artillery ammunition, red; for cavalry, yellow; for infantry, light blue. The wagons will also be distinctly marked with the number of
the corps and division to which they belong and the kind and caliber of ammunition contained."
A division of 15k troops was allotted 4.26 miles of roadway, with an additional 1.5 miles for the divisional wagons. Would take 2.5 hours to pass one point.
A division of 15k troops was allotted 4.26 miles of roadway, with an additional 1.5 miles for the divisional wagons. Would take 2.5 hours to pass one point.
A battery of six guns had six caissons, a battery wagon, and a travelling forge. Each was hauled by a six horse team. Number of horses in a battery were 101. Each gun's caisson carried 128 organic rounds for that piece.
Resupply came from the division artillery wagon trains
Resupply came from the division artillery wagon trains
Of the regimental wagons, 1 was for the surgeon, 1 for tents & baggage of field & staff officers, 1 for baggage of line officers, 1 for the cooking equipment of line companies, & 2 carried rations for 2 days
Men carried 3 days of marching rations, giving 5 days of mobility
Men carried 3 days of marching rations, giving 5 days of mobility
A cow could furnish 450 rations of 3/4 lb of smoked meat per person. 8 cows could provide marching rations for a brigade. Commissary Sgt oversaw the care & slaughtering of beef on the hoof. Collected the hides to be turned into the Army for proof of use & for recycling to leather
This is all to say: warfare in the 19th century was incredibly complex and synchronization of *any* of the warfighting functions was a massive task. Sustainment was key. If you could not sustain, if you could not develop sustainment doctrine, SOPs, standardization, you died.
For more on how those standardizations came to be, I highly recommend this book: 
Where you'll also realize that George McClellan is a manifestly worse general than you ever even thought possible. So. Damn. Bad.
Calling him the "commander" of the Army of the Potomac is a falsehood, because he never was there to command it during the Seven Days Campaign
Calling him the "commander" of the Army of the Potomac is a falsehood, because he never was there to command it during the Seven Days Campaign
