My new essay in @TheAtlantic on how Coronavirus killed the revolution:
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
This is probably one of the more personal pieces I've done. It's been only a few weeks, and I can see myself changing. Some of it's political exhaustion, which renders the smallness of politics and our past debates all the more obvious 
Some of the biggest controversies of recent months and years seem almost silly in retrospect—and certainly in comparison: Brexit, the Trump impeachment trial, and the killing of Soleimani
I didn't want this. Most of what I argue in this essay goes against my own preferences. I've been a big critic of "normalcy" politics (Biden) and an even bigger critic of technocracy. But crisis is allowing me to better grasp their appeal
As I write in the piece: "One can take only so much crisis before the desire for vaguely normal lives and vaguely competent leaders takes hold" theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
This is the paradox of crises like the one we're in: They can produce two completely contradictory responses—and it depends, in part, on the psychology and idiosyncrasies of individuals. We respond differently because *we* are different
Even before Coronavirus, this was already a stark divide within the Democratic party. Minority voters potentially had the most to gain from a Sanders nomination but also the most to lose
If you considered Trump the "threat," was the priority to remove the threat, or to remove what made the threat possible in the first place? Was it possible to address these two questions simultaneously or was it better to sequence them?
