Some more thoughts on the economics of delaying #FreedomDay (please read the whole thread before shouting at me!).
Keeping the remaining Covid restrictions for a few weeks longer would be unlikely to derail the recovery, but could still have some significant impacts… (1/6)
The sectors that are still severely restricted account for less than 5% of GDP, and most are already open to some degree.
Money not spent in pubs or nightclubs (or holidays abroad) can also still be spent elsewhere in the UK economy... (2/6)
The direct cost of postponing Freedom Day would therefore be relatively small compared to full #lockdowns, probably no more than 2% of GDP, or less than £1 billion for every week of delay.
That’s not peanuts, but nor is it prohibitive. (3/6)
There could still be some additional costs.
Even a short delay would be the final straw for many businesses, especially pubs, that have only just survived until now. They may not come back at all.
Any bump in the roadmap could also undermine confidence more generally... (4/6)
More positively, those worried about the recent surge in #Covid cases could be reassured by a brief delay, especially if it is for the specific purpose of accelerating the vaccine rollout.
It might be more damaging to reopen now and then have to shut again soon afterwards. (5/6)
The temporary hit from a brief delay could therefore be a price worth paying *both* to protect health *and* to secure a stronger economic recovery in the longer term.
But the most vulnerable sectors would require additional financial support to tide them over. (6/6)
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A bit more on today's UK trade data and the impact of #Brexit...
It helps to look at #imports and #exports *separately* - the stories are quite different.
The relative weakness of UK trade with the EU is mainly on the *import* side, which is only partly Brexit related... (1/6)
A lot is also due to problems in the car sector (e.g. global shortages of parts) and the relative weakness of demand for cars, which we mainly import from the EU, compared to goods we import from the rest of the world (e.g. clothing & PPE from Asia)... (2/6)
There may also be some cases where UK imports from the EU are being replaced by imports from the rest of the world, or local production.
But if consumers were happy buying from the EU before #Brexit, new trade frictions that hinder this are not obviously a 'good thing'... (3/6)
📢 thread: 12 reasons to be cheerful about the UK #economy in 2021🎄
I know 2021 will be another tough year for many people and businesses, but I’m aiming here to provide some counterbalance to the more negative commentary you can easily find elsewhere...
1. The household sector (in aggregate) has built up substantial #savings during the pandemic that could be used to fuel a strong recovery in #consumer spending. Obviously, the distribution is uneven and much still depends on confidence. But…
2. Consumer ##confidence jumped by the most in eight years in December on the good news on the #vaccine. Even in November, households were the least pessimistic about #job security since March, despite the grim headlines...
FWIW, I’m relatively relaxed about the fiscal costs of #Covid: borrowing will drop sharply as the economy recovers, the #debt burden is manageable, and there’s no need for #austerity to pay for it.
But this isn’t a green light to abandon fiscal responsibility altogether… (1/12)
For a start, the long-term outlook is more worrying.
The #OBR’s Fiscal Sustainability Report (July) includes scenarios where unchecked increases in public spending on health, adult social care and pensions could see debt balloon to more than 400% of GDP in 2070... (2/12)
In the meantime, even if the government doesn’t face the same financial constraints as a household, high public spending and borrowing still has other costs, including the poor allocation of resources and the risk of runaway #inflation… (3/12)
I’ve read some utter tosh on the state of the UK public finances in the last few days. Here's an attempt to correct some of the biggest misunderstandings.
Most importantly, government debt does not have to be ‘repaid’, only serviced... (1/19)
As long as the government can meet the interest payments (I’ll discuss the risks here later), maturing debt can simply be rolled over. (2/19)
This is what usually happens. The last time the UK ran a budget surplus was in 2000-01, since when public debt has increased by more than £1,700 billion. (3/19)
FWIW, I’ve been comparing my UK economic forecasts with those of the #OBR. There is a much more positive story than the Chancellor told in Wednesday’s #SpendingReview#SR20 📢
Let’s start with the near-term outlook… (1/8)
The #OBR assumes that the economic impact of #lockdown2 will be ‘three-fifths’ that seen during the first lockdown, when #GDP fell by 25% in March and April. This means that lockdown2 would take the level of #GDP back to 15% below its pre-Covid peak… (2/8)
Given that #GDP was 8.2% lower in September than February, and assuming little change in October, this is consistent with a fall of around 7% m/m in November, which is what’s in the #OBR’s ‘central forecast’. This seems about right to me... (3/8)
I see some are arguing that the economic hit from #coronavirus means we should now extend the #brexit transition period (or even #rejoinEU 🙄). They typically make up to four points – but none of them seem at all convincing… (1/6)
First, that it's now much harder for UK and EU negotiators to travel and meet in person. But so what? This is the age of video conferencing and the internet, and we can surely work around this... (2/6)
Second, that government energy spent on #Brexit negotiations would be better spent on dealing with #coronavirus. I have a little more sympathy with this point, but don’t we still have enough ministers, civil servants etc to do more than one thing at a time? (3/6)