Thread by @ZenonasTziarras

A 🧵 on aspects of the #EU's #StrategicCompass, including #EastMed

1. The release of this document is important in itself. Putting it together was a long and complex process. It was a difficult but valuable effort to bridge MS national interests/concerns & present a cohesive >>

"plan of action for strengthening the EU's #security and #defence policy by 2030."

2. The objective of making the EU "a stronger and more capable security provider" is rather ambitious. Especially since the doc admits that EU security & defense will be complementary to #NATO >>

"which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members".

3. However it should be noted that the objectives under the 1st of the 4 pillars (i.e. Act) can enhance the EU's military and security role. These include:

- a Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops>

- readiness to deploy 200 fully equipped CSDP mission experts
- regular live exercises on land and at sea
- enhanced military mobility
- reinforcement of #EU's civilian and military #CSDP missions and operations 
- full use of the European Peace Facility to support partners
>>

4. In terms of the strategic environment and threat assessment, it shouldn't come as a surprise that #Russia is seems as the number one challenge, due to the #UkraineRussiaWar. Reminding here that this is also in line with the #US State Department's view on international malign>>

influences - #Russia, #China and #Iran.
For the #EU, China "is a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival". It's therefore acknowledged that China is a potential threat (as an emerging global & non-western power), but also a crucial economic partner.>>

As such, the #EU seems to largely share the #US security perceptions. This can contribute to deeper transatlantic relations, notwithstanding the EU's moderate efforts towards strategic autonomy. To be sure these dynamics depend on various other issues as well. >>

5. Now regarding the #EastMed, there is a short but not insignificant section. The document refers to "provocations and unilateral actions against EU Member States and violations of
sovereign rights in breach of international law, as well as the instrumentalisation of >>

irregular
migration, and have the potential to escalate quickly; ensuring a stable and secure environment as
well as a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship, in line with the principle of good-
neighbourly relations, is in the interest of both the EU and #Turkey." >

The text avoids connecting directly the unilateral provocations to #Turkey, but by the end of the paragraph the intention is clear. It should be noted that this inclusion was not easy to achieve. States such as #Cyprus and #Greece that among the most concerned w Turkey >>

included #Turkey as a threat but were very careful not to be Turkey-centred, demonstrating sensitivity w regard to shared and broader EU security concerns as well. Thus, the mention to Turkey was important and indicative of the EU-TR tensions over the past years, but >>

overall it was a rather moderate one.

Of course, #Turkey didn't see it that way. The TR Foreign Ministry published a statement (see pic) that discounted the text's wording trying, once again, to leverage TR's strategic significance for #NATO and the #EU to bypass criticism. >>

Generally, #StrategicCompass is an important document that takes the Union one step forward in matters of security, defense and even foreign policy. It will not magically solve the #EU's unity and autonomy problems. But we should see this as marathon, not a sprint. >>

And today, more than ever, also because of the #UkraineRussiaWar, it seems that the preconditions for a deeper EU integration are in place.

Find the #StrategicCompass docs here: eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/h…

End of #thread.