There's been much speculation about an imminent #Turkey intervention in north #Syria (another one) 🧵
The rationale behind such a move would be threefold: 1. The Kurdish threat 2. Electoral tactics (which might backfire) 3. Revisionist plans-strategic leverage re #Syria's future
Can #Turkey go ahead? The short answers is "yes". The long answer is "it's complicated".
If previous interventions are any indication, two things we know: 1. TR prepares the ground diplomatically and 2. remains flexible during operations, negotiating the outcome.
A Turkish intervention would most likely mean that Ankara got the "green light" from #Russia and/or #US. A move west of Euphrates would mostly need the former; east of Euphrates, both.
In exchange, #Turkey would have to compromise as well vis-a-vis it's ideal objectives.
What's the ideal then? The ideal would have two dimensions: one to the west (close to Euphrates, see below) and one east of Peace Spring territories in eastern #Syria (next tweet). The ideal objective re the former would be to finish what they started in 2019, >>
namely expand the #Turkey-controlled territories (at least) along M4 highway to the west, capture #Kobani, cross #Euphrates, capture #Manbij & unite Peace Spring (blue) & Euphrates Shield (green) territories: clear out any Kurdish forces from Turkish border & west of Euphrates.
That would radically diminish the prospects of a Kurdish statelet on the border and not least its prospects for an exit to the Mediterranean - anyway an overly ambitious Kurdish aspiration.
The second dimension has the same logic but concerns the northeastern border of #Syria. >
In this case, Ankara would want to seal the border from Ras-al Ain all the way to Malikiyah. This would basically cut off any support to #YPG coming from #Iraq, #Syria, #Turkey (perhaps even #Iran). Turkish forces stationed in northern Iraq could support such an operation.
However both fronts pose significant challenges. Provided that #Turkey got the go-ahead from #Russia and #US generally speaking, Kobani and Manbij would still be very difficult to capture. The former in particular is of great symbolic (in addition to its strategic) significance.
In the east, Qamishli has a similar importance and value, with both Kurdish and pro-Assad forces in the area. Not to mention pro-#Iran forces, and say nothing of the Russian presence.
In addition to their own interests/concerns, the Kurdish and Assad elements (seen as proxies) cannot leave #US and #Russia entirely indifferent.
After all, previous Turkish interventions have demonstrated their revisionist (not only defensive) character & influence consolidation
So what can the outcome be? 2 scenarios stand out I think: 1. Have an agreed upon limited intervention (way off the aforementioned ideal) 2. Convince #Turkey not to proceed in exchange for some deal w #Kurds and #Assad. E.g. Some Kurdish units withdraw ceding control to Assad
In these scenarios, the old Russian-Turkish formula on jointly patrolling certain areas could also be applied.
There's of course the possibility of a. no intervention at all & b. an irrational large scale intervention that'd disregard the aforementioned constraints
However I don't think they're the most likely. I believe that, under #Erdogan, another move in #Syria is a matter of time, in one way or the other.
Whether that will help him in the elections (if it happens in the next 1-2 years) is not certain.
Right now, domestic instability and polarization do not really play in his favour. #CHP is already against the prospect. Yet an intervention could help divide the opposition which is already struggling to create a united platform against #Erdogan.
[End of Thread]
A relevant report I wrote with @JohnPikpas back in 2020: What Peace for Syria? Spheres of Influence, the Sunni Opposition and the Day After
With #Turkey visiting #Egypt to normalize relations and an upcoming FM Summit between #Cyprus, #Greece, #Israel and #UAE on security and economy it seems that we have two parallel geopolitical dynamics shaping.
A. Turkey is trying to disrupt the emergent block of cooperation in the #Eastmed (that includes extra-regional actors) and deny international power multipliers from #Greece and #Cyprus in particular. Plus it promotes a different regional status quo, including on maritime zones. >
B. In parallel, #Greece, #Cyprus, #Israel and #UAE are trying to set up a different mechanism that will not be restricted by the dynamics & monothematic character of #EMGF. [UAE are unable to enter EMGF due to Palestinian veto]. This will allow them to enhance cooperation in >>
#Turkey is currently following a two-fold strategy in the broader #EasternMediterranean. On the one hand it embarked, at least ostensibly, on an effort to normalize its relations with a number of regional countries including #Egypt, #Israel, #Greece, #France and the #UAE. >
Ankara expects that this will convince the #US and #EU that it adopted a more pro-western and constructive foreign policy orientation. Both the talks with #Greece and the developments in the #Cyprus process aim to appease the EU, advance Turkish-EU relations, and >>
1. "The Egyptian-Greek Exclusive Economic Zone (#EEZ) deal is important because it settles, at least partly, an issue that has been open for decades in the area and completes another small [piece of the] puzzle in the maritime zone disputes of the #EasternMediterranean"
2. #Turkey's actions aim to“to deconstruct the existing regional status quo & security architecture & bring about a new one that will be more beneficial to itself, in terms of the geopolitical space, the natural resources and the maritime routes that it will be able to control.”
Another article (not surprisingly on Al Jazeera) trying to convince us that #Ankara is the victim and Turkish foreign policy is on the defence. The approach is superficial at best and ignores a number of facts >>
That Turkey unofficially abandoned regime change in #Syria is not the point: same author, in 2013 Hinnebusch & Tur book wrote "Turkey saw an opportunity to bring abt regime change in Damascus at Iran's expense...it was a matter of geopolitical competition between Ankara & Tehran"
Regime change was an unprecedented policy for Ankara to adopt & a revisionist one; by the author's admission, for the purpose of regional power. 4 interventions later it's inaccurate to say that "Turkey's ability to influence the course of the conflict was reduced to a minimum"