🧵On #Turkey-#Israel and talk of a #gas pipeline

After a tour in #Greece and #Cyprus, that aimed at appeasing their concerns, Israeli president was today visiting Turkey in the context of improving bilateral relations. Its the first visit by an Israeli president since 2008. >
Though allies since 1996, relations started to deteriorate as early as 2004 & took a huge blow in 2010 w the #MaviMarmara incident. Not going to get into that or the steps that followed towards normalization.
See this on #Turkey's strategy in the #EastMed in Foreign Policy: foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/19/tur…

and this book: link.springer.com/book/10.1007/9…
#Erdogan started shifting his foreign policy shortly before #Biden's election to the #US presidency. Both because of opposition & economic pressures domestically (i.e. his ultimate goal: to get reelected in 2023), and an effort to "restart" its relations with the West. >
This change included efforts for - at least tactically - improved relations with #Israel, #Egypt, #Greece, #UAE, #KSA, #Armenia etc.

The new government in #Israel did not carry the baggage of the breakdown with #Turkey and therefore wasn't as invested in prolonging the stalemate
ISR also understands, as it always has, that #Turkey is a regional power that cannot be ignored. Be it because of its role in #Syria, its power projection in the #EastMed, its leverage with #Iran, & perhaps most importantly its support of the Palestinians and specifically #Hamas.
This was one of the core weakness that prevented the further deepening of #Israel's partnership with #Cyprus and #Greece. More on this here: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

Moreover in the absence of any tangible results in #energy cooperation w #Cyprus and #Greece on exports >>
(including the #EastMed pipeline) or within the #EMFG (w the exception of course of #Egypt), #Turkey seemed to offer at least theoretically another option to reach #Europe. Thus a the idea of a #Turkey-#Israel - that was floating around early/mid-2010s - is back on the table. >
#Erdogan is trying to present this visit as a 'turning point' with a focus on #trade, #tourism, and #energy cooperation. So the aim is to 1. project a different foreign policy image, 2. serve the objectives of its #energy security strategy, and 3. boost the economy. >
#Israel is pursuing similar objective and also, importantly, the change of #Turkey's stance vis-a-vis #Hamas. Whether that will materialize remains to be seen.

Now, with all the chaos around the #UkraineRussiaWar, what about this pipeline?
Obviously Europe's need to diversify its energy imports away from #Russia is more urgent than ever. Alternative sources have to sought beyond American #LNG and this includes renewables (a slow transition), the #Caspian and the #EastMed. >>
This climate, renders an ISR-TR-EUR pipeline more plausible but not easier. One thing has to be clarified to begin with: No pipeline can be constructed between any two states if political relations are not good. Not just in the process of normalization but good and trusting. >
#Turkey-#Israel might get there, but they're not there yet.

It's however true that many actors might want to support such a project, such as the US & EU. It serves Western interests, it'd be relatively cheap - cheaper, more feasible & more competitive than #EastMed pipeline.>
At least one major problem remains: #Cyprus. Such a pipeline would have to go through #Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) - going through #Lebanon's & #Syria's would arguably be even more difficult.

Technically, third countries are allowed to lay a pipeline in another's EEZ>
Based on Article 58 paras 1-3 of #UNCLOS III, states that wish to do so - though allowed - ld take into account the coastal state's concerns re the pipeline's route, environmental security etc. Which means #Cyprus could raise obstacles if an agreement disregarded its interests. >
So far preconditions for pipeline:
1. Normalization of TR-ISR relations
2. External support and investment
3. Energy market dynamics
4. Get Cyprus on board

Getting Cyprus on board would not be an easy task. Nicosia is already anxious about this scenario. >
It would take great convincing from the #US and #EU as well as assurances (or something in exchange) from #Israel.

As #Cyprus peace talks are in a stalemate & there are thoughts about introducing CBMs, there's a chance that if this project proceeds beyond being just an idea >
the pipeline could be somehow brought into the Cyprus negotiations as an agenda item, potentially even including Cyprus itself. And this would have to involve energy companies as well. Even then nothing would be guaranteed. >>
These are some speculations just to demonstrate that things won't be easy for a TR-ISR pipeline, although knowing how things can suddenly change in the #MidEast/#EastMed and what the resolve (or 'convincing') of external actors could achieve, I would never say never. >>
What is certain, is that the #EastMed security architecture is undergoing another important change akin - though reverse - to that of the early 2010s. And it was expected as analysed here: oxfordre.com/internationals…

Maybe the #Turkey-#Egypt relationship is next.

End of #thread.

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More from @ZenonasTziarras

Mar 9
Τουρκία-Ισραήλ 🧵

Την 28η Φεβ., εν όψη της επίσκεψης του Ισραηλινού προέδρου Χέρτζογκ σε Κύπρο (κ αργότερα Τουρκία), ο Ισραηλινός πρέσβης στην Κύπρο σχολίαζε τις εξελίξεις στις τουρκο-ισραηλινές σχέσεις. >>
Δήλωνε, μεταξύ άλλων, στον "Φ" πως οι σχέσεις στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο δεν είναι "παιχνίδι με μηδενικό άθροισμα" - "η μια κίνηση δεν γίνεται σε βάρος της άλλης". Τον Νοε. του 2021, στο 17ο Συνέδριο το Economist στη Λευκωσία, ο τότε ΥπΕξ Ν. Χριστοδουλίδης δήλωνε: >>
"...είναι γεγονός ότι έχουν πλέον καλλιεργηθεί...σχέσεις καλής γειτονίας και έχει εμπεδωθεί μια νοοτροπία θετικής ατζέντας. ...συλλογικός στόχος παραμένει η δημιουργία μιας κατάστασης αμοιβαίου κέρδους, παρά ενός παιχνιδιού μηδενικού αθροίσματος για τα κράτη της περιοχής." >>
Read 16 tweets
Mar 8
🧵Mια υπενθύμιση καθώς διεθνείς εντάσεις κ πόλωση βρσκουν έκφραση στον δημόσιο διάλογο, ενίοτε με τοξικό τρόπο κ πολλούς προσβεβλημένους: Η χρήση σαρκασμού, ειρωνίας, σάτιρας κ κωμωδίας είναι ένας εντελώς legit τρόπος σχολιασμού της (πολιτικής) πραγματικότητας>
#UkraineRussianWar
Από τον Αριστοφάνη μέχρι την Φάρμα των Ζώων και από το Wag the Dog (1997) μέχρι τον Borat (2006 & 2020) κ τις καθημερινές/βραδινές σατιρικές εκπομπές τύπου Talk Show ή Stand Up ανά το παγκόσμιο, αυτού του είδους η πολιτική κριτική περνά μηνύματα και καυτηριάζει ίσως όσο καμία >
σοβαρή ή σοβαροφανής εκπομπή με πολιτικούς - ή κ αναλυτές - "talking heads", που επαναλαμβάνουν τα ίδια πράγματα ανεξαρτήτως του πότε ή του πού θα τους ακούσεις. Όπως φυσικά κ κάθε άλλη μορφή Τέχνης-πού να πρωτοαναφερθεί κανείς; Δεν είναι τυχαίο που αυτή ενίοτε φιμώνεται. >
Read 9 tweets
Nov 4, 2021
There's been much speculation about an imminent #Turkey intervention in north #Syria (another one) 🧵

The rationale behind such a move would be threefold:
1. The Kurdish threat
2. Electoral tactics (which might backfire)
3. Revisionist plans-strategic leverage re #Syria's future
Can #Turkey go ahead? The short answers is "yes". The long answer is "it's complicated".

If previous interventions are any indication, two things we know: 1. TR prepares the ground diplomatically and 2. remains flexible during operations, negotiating the outcome.
A Turkish intervention would most likely mean that Ankara got the "green light" from #Russia and/or #US. A move west of Euphrates would mostly need the former; east of Euphrates, both.

In exchange, #Turkey would have to compromise as well vis-a-vis it's ideal objectives.
Read 16 tweets
Apr 16, 2021
With #Turkey visiting #Egypt to normalize relations and an upcoming FM Summit between #Cyprus, #Greece, #Israel and #UAE on security and economy it seems that we have two parallel geopolitical dynamics shaping.

#thread

>>
A. Turkey is trying to disrupt the emergent block of cooperation in the #Eastmed (that includes extra-regional actors) and deny international power multipliers from #Greece and #Cyprus in particular. Plus it promotes a different regional status quo, including on maritime zones. >
B. In parallel, #Greece, #Cyprus, #Israel and #UAE are trying to set up a different mechanism that will not be restricted by the dynamics & monothematic character of #EMGF. [UAE are unable to enter EMGF due to Palestinian veto]. This will allow them to enhance cooperation in >>
Read 5 tweets
Apr 15, 2021
Comments on #Turkey's policy in the #EastMed alongside colleague @JMJalel_H.

Elaborated thoughts in thread below, including about today's Greek-Turkish meeting/press conference>
#Turkey is currently following a two-fold strategy in the broader #EasternMediterranean. On the one hand it embarked, at least ostensibly, on an effort to normalize its relations with a number of regional countries including #Egypt, #Israel, #Greece, #France and the #UAE. >
Ankara expects that this will convince the #US and #EU that it adopted a more pro-western and constructive foreign policy orientation. Both the talks with #Greece and the developments in the #Cyprus process aim to appease the EU, advance Turkish-EU relations, and >>
Read 11 tweets
Aug 25, 2020
A piece by @MadaMasr on the #EastMed tensions with my two cents.

#Thread with some of my comments.

[Do read the whole thing, it's extensive and very balanced]

#Turkey #Egypt #Cyprus #Greece #Israel #UAE #Libya @prioMidEast @PRIOUpdates @PRIOCyprus

madamasr.com/en/2020/08/25/…
1. "The Egyptian-Greek Exclusive Economic Zone (#EEZ) deal is important because it settles, at least partly, an issue that has been open for decades in the area and completes another small [piece of the] puzzle in the maritime zone disputes of the #EasternMediterranean"
2. #Turkey's actions aim to“to deconstruct the existing regional status quo & security architecture & bring about a new one that will be more beneficial to itself, in terms of the geopolitical space, the natural resources and the maritime routes that it will be able to control.”
Read 15 tweets

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