Thread by @ZenonasTziarras

🧵On #Turkey-#Israel and talk of a #gas pipeline

After a tour in #Greece and #Cyprus, that aimed at appeasing their concerns, Israeli president was today visiting Turkey in the context of improving bilateral relations. Its the first visit by an Israeli president since 2008. >

Though allies since 1996, relations started to deteriorate as early as 2004 & took a huge blow in 2010 w the #MaviMarmara incident. Not going to get into that or the steps that followed towards normalization.

See this on #Turkey's strategy in the #EastMed in Foreign Policy: foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/19/tur…

and this book: link.springer.com/book/10.1007/9…

#Erdogan started shifting his foreign policy shortly before #Biden's election to the #US presidency. Both because of opposition & economic pressures domestically (i.e. his ultimate goal: to get reelected in 2023), and an effort to "restart" its relations with the West. >

This change included efforts for - at least tactically - improved relations with #Israel, #Egypt, #Greece, #UAE, #KSA, #Armenia etc.

The new government in #Israel did not carry the baggage of the breakdown with #Turkey and therefore wasn't as invested in prolonging the stalemate

ISR also understands, as it always has, that #Turkey is a regional power that cannot be ignored. Be it because of its role in #Syria, its power projection in the #EastMed, its leverage with #Iran, & perhaps most importantly its support of the Palestinians and specifically #Hamas.

This was one of the core weakness that prevented the further deepening of #Israel's partnership with #Cyprus and #Greece. More on this here: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

Moreover in the absence of any tangible results in #energy cooperation w #Cyprus and #Greece on exports >>

(including the #EastMed pipeline) or within the #EMFG (w the exception of course of #Egypt), #Turkey seemed to offer at least theoretically another option to reach #Europe. Thus a the idea of a #Turkey-#Israel - that was floating around early/mid-2010s - is back on the table. >

#Erdogan is trying to present this visit as a 'turning point' with a focus on #trade, #tourism, and #energy cooperation. So the aim is to 1. project a different foreign policy image, 2. serve the objectives of its #energy security strategy, and 3. boost the economy. >

#Israel is pursuing similar objective and also, importantly, the change of #Turkey's stance vis-a-vis #Hamas. Whether that will materialize remains to be seen.

Now, with all the chaos around the #UkraineRussiaWar, what about this pipeline?

Obviously Europe's need to diversify its energy imports away from #Russia is more urgent than ever. Alternative sources have to sought beyond American #LNG and this includes renewables (a slow transition), the #Caspian and the #EastMed. >>

This climate, renders an ISR-TR-EUR pipeline more plausible but not easier. One thing has to be clarified to begin with: No pipeline can be constructed between any two states if political relations are not good. Not just in the process of normalization but good and trusting. >

#Turkey-#Israel might get there, but they're not there yet.

It's however true that many actors might want to support such a project, such as the US & EU. It serves Western interests, it'd be relatively cheap - cheaper, more feasible & more competitive than #EastMed pipeline.>

At least one major problem remains: #Cyprus. Such a pipeline would have to go through #Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) - going through #Lebanon's & #Syria's would arguably be even more difficult.

Technically, third countries are allowed to lay a pipeline in another's EEZ>

Based on Article 58 paras 1-3 of #UNCLOS III, states that wish to do so - though allowed - ld take into account the coastal state's concerns re the pipeline's route, environmental security etc. Which means #Cyprus could raise obstacles if an agreement disregarded its interests. >

So far preconditions for pipeline:
1. Normalization of TR-ISR relations
2. External support and investment
3. Energy market dynamics
4. Get Cyprus on board

Getting Cyprus on board would not be an easy task. Nicosia is already anxious about this scenario. >

It would take great convincing from the #US and #EU as well as assurances (or something in exchange) from #Israel.

As #Cyprus peace talks are in a stalemate & there are thoughts about introducing CBMs, there's a chance that if this project proceeds beyond being just an idea >

the pipeline could be somehow brought into the Cyprus negotiations as an agenda item, potentially even including Cyprus itself. And this would have to involve energy companies as well. Even then nothing would be guaranteed. >>

These are some speculations just to demonstrate that things won't be easy for a TR-ISR pipeline, although knowing how things can suddenly change in the #MidEast/#EastMed and what the resolve (or 'convincing') of external actors could achieve, I would never say never. >>

What is certain, is that the #EastMed security architecture is undergoing another important change akin - though reverse - to that of the early 2010s. And it was expected as analysed here: oxfordre.com/internationals…

Maybe the #Turkey-#Egypt relationship is next.

End of #thread.