Thread by @MikkoLaaksonen1

Key points from @RUSI_org report regarding Russian invasion of Ukraine, period Feb - Jul 2022.
1/x. Russia planned to invade Ukraine over a 10-day period and thereafter occupy the country to enable annexation by August 2022.
rusi.org/explore-our-re…

3/x The plan was to murder #Ukraine executive branch (president Zelenskyi and the government) and imprison the parliament. Pro-#Russia parliamentarians would form a "Movement for #Peace".

4/x #Nuclear power plants were planned to function as secure bases, depots and command centres, to control #energy in #Ukraine and to threaten #Europe countries with pollution.

5/x "These plans were drawn up by a very small group of officials and the intent was directed by #Putin." Many officials were unaware of the plan to invade, were informed only days before and tactical units only hours before.

6/x Partly due to retention problems and short contracts, Ukraine had rotated a large amount of personnel in #ATO 2014-2022. "One of the major errors in #Russian planning for the invasion was its assessment of the number of reservists #Ukraine could mobilise"

7/x well, this is what we always discuss with #Finland reservists: "The critical question therefore was whether the professional body of the UAF could hold for long enough for a wider mobilisation to bolster #Ukraine’s defences in the event of war"

8/x Since March 2014, Ukraine has focused on recovering its artillery capabilities. As a result, five new artillery brigades and a separate artillery regiment of the Ground Forces were created, as well as one artillery brigade and a separate artillery regiment of the Navy

9/x "The difference in numbers between Russian and Ukrainian artillery was not so significant at
the beginning of the conflict: 2,433 barrel artillery systems against 1,176, and 3,547 MLRS
against 1,680. "

10/x #Russia sabotage had destroyed about 210 000 tonnes of #Ukraine ammunition stores since 2014. 70 000 tonnes had been spent in war since 2014. The forces had ammunition for about six weeks of intensive fighting.

11/x All artillery units had #UAV:s. "‘Kropyva’ combat control system – saw an 80% reduction in the deployment time for artillery units. Simultaneously, the amount of time to destroy an unplanned target was reduced by two-thirds, and the time to open counter-battery fire by 90%"

12/x Like #Finland doctrine: "Thus, Ukrainian defence plans aimed at using manoeuvre forces to fix and canalise attackers to enable their destruction by concentrated artillery fire"

13/x #Ukraine used tanks for indirect fire missions, as mobile reserves capable of defending themselves. "during the years of the war in Donbas, the tankers of the UAF changed traditional approaches and developed techniques for indirect fire"

14/x #Ukraine had refitted about 500 tanks in 2014-2018, bringing the force to about 900 tanks. #Russia had about 2800 and 400 with the proxy forces. Main equipment was modernized T-64:s, but T-72 and T-80 were also deployed.

15/x "the anti-tank capabilities of the UAF at Feb 2022 amounted to around 950 ATGW launchers (Javelin, ‘Stugna-P’, ‘Corsar’, ‘Barrier’) 9,100 missiles. Short-ranged systems NLAW, Kobra/Kombat missiles, as more than a thousand Fagot and Metis ATGWs and several thousand missiles"

16/x "It took 30 days to prepare crews
arriving from military units to properly employ #Stugna-P. #Javelin, by contrast, was much easier to employ, requiring days to train crews, while personnel
could be trained to use #NLAW in hours"

17/x "The radio engineering forces of #Ukraine consisted of four brigades, whose units maintained continuous radar coverage along the state border and ensured monitoring of the airspace of Ukraine. The modernised 3D radar 35D6M can detect up to 300 air targets at 360 km"

18/x "After 2014, the armed forces also received about 50 mobile ‘Malachite’ radars, #Ukrainian modification of the Soviet P-18MU ‘Terek’ radar. ‘#Malakhit’ can detect targets moving at a speed of up to 1,000 m/s and tracking up to 256 targets at a distance
of up to 400 km."

19/x "Overall, the UAF held 35 S-300PS/PT divisions, nine S-125 divisions, three S-300B divisions and 15 divisions of the Buk-M1 air-defence system. " Division roughly equivalent to battalion.

20/x As of 24 February 2022, the Ukrainian Air Force had about 50 MiG-29 fighters: 40th Tactical Aviation Brigade in Vasylkiv, 114th Tactical Aviation Brigade in IvanoFrankivsk, 32 Su-27 fighters operated by the 831st tactical aviation brigade in Myrhorod, 39th in Ozerny.

21/x An important element of the training was working out the survivability of units through the ability to disperse aircraft from the main airfields to operational ones. (..) training of maintenance crews, to carry out pre-flight preparation of aircraft in field conditions

22/x "Because Ukrainian pilots understood the technical limitations of their aircraft, and capabilities of Russian anti-aircraft systems, they had trained for low-level flight over Ukrainian territory and were highly familiar with exploitation of terrain to evade radar detection"

23/x Radar ‘Mineral-U’ is designed for detection in active and passive modes and classification of surface targets at up to 500–600 km. It is mounted on a truck platform, is highly mobile and adapted for close interaction with the anti-ship missile complex ‘Neptune’,

24/x Until days before the full-scale #Russian invasion, the intelligence community of #Ukraine broadly
assessed that the most dangerous enemy course of action was a high-intensity offensive against
#Donbas in late February 2022.

25/x First, an assessment of #Russian forces north of #Kyiv concluded that they lacked sufficient troops to effectively isolate and seize the city. The offensive was therefore viewed as a diversionary deployment, aimed at drawing and fixing #Ukrainian forces away from #Donbas.

26/x Second, interception of communications and observation of the #Russian units on the
#Gomel axis confirmed that the personnel did not believe they were going to war and were not
prepared for major combat operations.

27/x Ukraine held 10 brigades in #Donbas, forces around #Kharkiv, #Dnipro, #Sumy and #Odesa, a manoeuvre brigade and two artillery brigades in Kyiv, and units in training areas. No forces forwards on the #Gomel axis. No major units committed to defend the approach from #Crimea

28/x As #Gomel and #Chernihiv attacks became apparent, #Ukraine forces were ordered to redeploy 7 hours prior to invasion. Many units were not at assigned or prepared positions, fever troops to hold coast. #Ukrainian units found themselves in a
meeting engagement with the enemy.

29/x #Russia had the initiative at the operational level, but with tactical units surprised by what
they were ordered to do. #Ukraine was surprised at the operational level but with tactical units which had been preparing for this fight for eight years. Decided the 72 first hours

Will continue tomorrow. This is like reading a suspense novel. Also: so far ALL #Finland choices I know have been confirmed as correct.

30/x Initial #Russia air and missile strikes focused on targets in the rear, forces struck last. "As the tactical elements were the most mobile, however, this sequencing maximised the time available for tactical elements to displace"

31/x "Many strikes were struck that had not been
military positions for years." "against moving targets, new detections would apparently
be added to the target list, without removing the previous reported location, so that dynamic
strikes were often delivered too late."

32/x Strikes and #Jkraine displacement led to: "This suppression effect meant that for the first phase of the war, the success rate of interceptions of #Russian cruise missiles, for example, was around 12–18%. Given that this rose to 40–60% in the second phase of the conflict"

33/x "The majority of air-defence coverage for the southern coast around Kherson and Mykolaiv, was
destroyed or suppressed. Two air-defence sites screening the Dnipro river from north were destroyed, opening a gap in the defences which enabled the air assault against #Hostomel"

34/x #Ukraine officers were messaged in psyops "on the second day of the invasion, #Putin publicly appealed to the Ukrainian military to not resist the #Russian invasion. This failed campaign also highlights the poor assessment of the psychology of the Ukrainian military"

35/x Mistaken battle damage assessment allowed deception: "the #Russian military appears to have presumed that if an action had been ordered and carried out then it had succeeded, unless there was direct evidence to the contrary"

36/x "#Russian satellite reconnaissance proved very limited, (..) A probable reason for this may be the insufficient number of satellites in the orbital grouping of the VKS and the overestimation of their technical capabilities." April, #Russia started buying commercial sat pics

37/x Problems in battle damage assessment and recon allowed systematic #Ukraine deception to succeed. Destroyed sites were reused and camouflaged as damaged, not destroyed sites were reported as destroyed.

38/x #Russian air-defence units were told to presume that aircraft were friendly. This enabled a significant number of ground-attack sorties by the #Ukrainian Air Force, including using UAVs such as TB2, against Russian formations, even when they had attached air-defence
units.

39/x The #Hostomel landing was enabled by the previously created gap in air defence. 2/10 of helicopters in first assault wave were shot down with MANPADS. The heliborne forces were [mostly] cleared by artillery and mechanised counterattack. Similar landings failed elsewhere.

40/x Orders were not distributed until 24 hours before the invasion to most ground units. #Russian troops lacked ammunition, fuel, food, maps, proper communications and, most critically, a clear understanding at the tactical level of how their actions fitted into the overall plan

41/x "It is not so much the case that tactical #Russian commanders are incapable of initiative or mission command, but rather that they lacked the detailed instructions of their commanders’ intent or their role within the wider battle plan to make such decisions"

42/x "#Russian units were ordered to proceed in administrative column, and to bypass UAF units. Many Russian soldiers arrived in towns without their weapons loaded. They were – for the most part – not anticipating heavy fighting"

43/x #Ukraine response: "First, a large portion of Ukraine’s special forces were committed on the #Gomel axis. Second, Ukraine mobilised reserve units near Kyiv. Third, the UAF mobilised cadets and staff of its military academies to force-generate additional infantry battalions"

44/x "Even with these efforts, #Russians achieved a 12:1 force ratio on the #Gomel axis. In #Chernihiv, the 1st Tank Brigade found itself encircled and lacking infantry support, necessarily drawing on territorial defence units and reservists to adopt all-round defence"

45/x "In #Donbas, the #Russian operations to fix the bulk of the UAF proved almost entirely successful.
Although the AFRF made little progress against the defensive positions along the line of contact,
it proved impossible for Ukrainian troops to be redeployed from this theatre"

46/x #Russian breakout from #Crimea proceeded in a manner consistent with the Russian invasion
plan, with #Melitopol and #Kherson seized with minimal fighting and significant progress made in
achieving the encirclement of #Mariupol to bring the city under a state of siege.

47/x "Russian progress towards #Kharkiv proved entirely contrary to their plan and their forces were repulsed with
heavy casualties. Initially Russian special forces entered the city in light vehicles, only to be isolated." - and then destroyed.

48/x Why advance from #Gomel stalled: psychological
state of the Russian troops. moving in administrative formations, They lacked understanding of where they were. They had not anticipated heavy fighting, they had no communications to report the situation or receive instructions.

49/x #Ukrainian forces found themselves bypassed and often confronted with columns of unprepared #Russian
troops. Even without higher instructions, the immediate task was clear to these units, and, at the tactical level, Ukrainian forces therefore retained the tactical initiative

50/x 1st Tank Brigade: numerous meeting engagements in forests at 100–200-m range, where restricted movement limited the Russian ability to bring
their mass to bear. Better crew training combined with shortranged engagements, the faster autoloader on the
T-64, led to success.

51/x By D+3, it was apparent to #Russian commanders that their plan had gone seriously wrong. It
was evident that #Ukraine’s air defences were still operational, that the Russian Ground Forces
had stalled, and that there was fierce resistance.

52/x #Russia activities of the special services in #Kyiv aimed at neutralising Ukraine’s political leadership – critical to Russia’s theory of victory – were failing as the Security Service of #Ukraine identified, isolated
and destroyed their infiltrated groups

53/x #Russia VKS changed tactics trom D+3,
large strike packages of interceptors and aircraft armed with anti-radiation missiles would form up to provoke #Ukrainian air defences into illuminating. These would then be suppressed and hunted by aircraft or helicopters at low level

54/x "#Ukrainian air defences deconflicted from the Ukrainian Air Force’s interdiction missions by
time, so that MiG-29s would conduct defensive counter-air sorties in pairs as the air defences
displaced" - could not be communicated to MANPADS operators among infantry

55/x "deconfliction of Ukraine’s air defences was changed to a spatial approach, with areas in depth assigned to defensive counterair patrols and areas to the rear assigned to air-defence forces." Air-air engagements often at ratio 6:2, some success due to poor #Russian training.

56/x In the first weeks of the invasion, when #Russian forces neglected the need to provide air cover, long convoys were subjected to #Ukraine air strikes by both Air Force and Army aircraft, Su-24M/MR bombers, Su-25 attack aircraft, Mi-24, Mi-8 helicopters, Bayraktar TB2 UAVs

57/x Air defence became harder by D+10 due to #Russia early warning, EW, communications, navigation and radar jamming. "#Ukrainian Air Force progressively lost
access to parts of the occupied territories. CAS, use of strike UAS became impossible over much of the battle space."

58/x "Russian command [decided] not to commit its maritime assault forces, which had been intended to conduct landings between #Mykolaiv and #Odesa. Two amphibious detachments of three large amphibious ships were formed." #Ukraine destroyed attempted reconnaissance landings.

59/x The #Russia #BTG organization was ill-suited to actual combat. The units were not uniform in equipment and strength and had not trained together, and had to be supplied with divisional supply. This led to poor situational awareness, lack of initiative and adaptation. p30-32

60/x The lack of situational awareness of tactical commanders near #Kyiv and #Kherson in
Mar–Apr 2022 led to the movement and supply of new units along the same routes, repeated attempts to conduct already-exposed manoeuvres, the use of the same locations for staging.

61/x Russian intelligence did not foresee the use of hydrotechnical structures.... hydraulic structures on the #Irpin River, which made it possible to raise the water level by 0.5–0.7 m and turn it into a significant obstacle for the #Russian troops who were rushing to #Kyiv

62/x By the time Colonel General Chaiko, commanding the Eastern Group of Forces, had re-established a clear picture of the battlespace, he faced a choice to break
through #Ukraine lines and sever the roads west of #Kyiv, or withdraw. Initially Russian forces attempted the former

63/x Unable to bring significant artillery or
ammunition forward, they took massive casualties and were at risk of encirclement. When the Central Group of Forces was failing to invest #Kyiv from the left bank, the decision was taken to withdraw from the #Gomel axis.

64/x The central group of forces failed as it had bypassed large #Ukraine combat units in #Chernihiv and #Sumy. In ambushes and meeting engagements "the tactical initiative of Ukrainian tactical units and special forces inflicted heavy casualties"

65/x Due "to the orders to bypass
centres of resistance, the #Russian units proceeded to try and encircle #Mykolaiv to the north. In doing so, they dissipated their combat power, gave the #Ukrainian Southern Command time to mobilise (..) and left themselves with an exposed flank"

66/x #Russia succeeded in encircling #Mariupol, which was then destroyed with similar tactics as #Grozny, as resistance was expected. #Ukraine units were separated. This indicates which kind of destruction #Russia would have inflicted if forces had been prepared for combat. p 36

67/x 3rd phase: #Russian forces would endeavour to implement what the UAF had assessed to be their most dangerous course of action from the outset: the destruction of the UAF in Donbas; seizure and annexation of #Luhansk, #Donetsk; force #Kyiv to negotiate on unfavourable terms.

68/x Results of press-ganging by #Russia in occupied territory "the mobilisation of conscripts in #Luhansk and #Donetsk had produced around 35,000
troops, heavy casualties in these formations left them highly irregular"

69/x after months fighting outnumbered, the very
high number of wounded – representing around 80% of casualties on the #Ukrainian side, with around 40% of wounded personnel sustaining permanent injuries – left a number of key units heavily depleted

70/x Fatigue and concussion from artillery
fire were serious issues best resolved through troop rotations. It became imperative to develop
techniques to ensure the rapid circulation of troops. Despite these challenges, morale within #Ukrainian units [in #Donbas] remained high

71/x The #Russian offensive on #Donbas proceeded in accordance with the sound logic of operational
encirclement through attacks to the north and south of the JFO. Although the overall operational concept was sound, no effort was made to disperse #Ukrainian forces on to other axes

72/x After attempt at an armoured breakthrough failed, the #Russian military resorted to manoeuvre by fire. The
efficiency of this approach was hindered by the unwillingness of their infantry to make deliberate assaults without massive artillery preparation of the target

73/x fixed-wing reconnaissance UAVs such as the Ukrainian #SKIF and Russian #Orlan-10 were especially valuable because they could fly at medium altitude, were too cheap to be economical targets for air defences and provided extensive imagery to enable rapid and
responsive fires

74/x "Of all #UAVs used by the #Ukraine in the first three phases of the war covered by this study, around 90% were destroyed. The average life expectancy of a quadcopter remained around three flights. The average life expectancy of a fixed-wing UAV was around six flights."

75/x #Russia artillery was deployed about 1/3 of its range behind forward line. The reaction time varied: artillery units with their own spotting could react in 5-6 min, tactical HQ in 20-30 min but operative HQ took up to 48 hours to react. (p 38-39)

76/x #Russia artillery would conduct counter-battery fire, but never from the targeted battery. A targeted battery would immediately displace , or the crews would seek cover until fire lifted. #Counterbattery fire would be assigned to a separate battery.

77/x during the offensive against #Donbas, #Russian artillery were firing around 20,000 rounds per day, with their peak fire rate surpassing 32,000 rounds on some
days. #Ukrainian fires rarely exceeded 6,000 rounds a day, reflecting a shortage of both barrels and ammunition

78/x The assault tactics employed by #Russian operations evolved over time. Initially there were repeated attempts to make progress using armoured thrusts. A shortage of infantry, and, in particular, of motivated and skilled infantry, led to heavy equipment losses.

79/x e Russians developed more effective means of attack. #LNR and #DNR conscripts would be pushed forwards to skirmish, forcing UAF positions to reveal themselves. These would be subjected to artillery The assault by more capable troops, airborne, #spetsnaz or #Wagner companies.

80/x #Russians also changed their use of armour from thrusts by platoon-sized groups of tanks supported by armoured infantry to using tanks for indirect fire or long-range engagements using barrel-launched ATGMs, copying the preferred approach of #Ukraine

81/x #Russia Tu-22M3 (Backfire), Tu-95MS (Bear) long-range bomber aircraft operated as launch platforms for missiles. For the period from February to the beginning of May 2022, approximately 180 Kh-22/32 and Kh-55/555 launches were recorded

82/x #Iskander 9M720 and 9M723 ballistic missiles were difficult or impossible to intercept. But by April 2022, #Russia shifted from salvo strikes to single missiles, perhaps conserving limited missile stocks.

83/x During the offensive on #Donbas, although long-range precision fires continued, the Russians
increasingly relied on obsolete systems. #Iskander replaced with 9K79 (SS-21 Scarab A), #Kalibr with 3K60 Bal (SSC-6 Sennight) and 3K55 Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge) coastal missiles.

84/x. #Russia doctrine located support at 50 km, where htey became targets for damage by the long-range MLRS BM-30 Smerch and Tochka-U of the UAF. Only at
end of April 2022 was the concentration of a significant part of the personnel, equipment and materiel moved beyond 50-km.

85/x From D+20–30 the #Russians began to exploit surviving rail infrastructure in the occupied territories for the transportation of troops and materiel. (...) Russian command managed to ensure the unloading of military echelons 30–50 km from the line of contact

86/x The mapping of depots and unit support areas, once #Ukraine obtained long-range precision fires (HIMARS; M270 MLRS), allowed for the systematic targeting of this logistics infrastructure and through this means the denial of the #Russian concept of operation.

87/x There is a perception that the #Russia AF are systemically incompetent, irredeemably corrupt, that weapons are ineffective and unreliable, the force is incapable of adapting. This narrative is dangerous, both because it is inaccurate, and because it encourages complacency.

88/x #Russia military suffered from major errors of judgement made by the Russian leadership, special services and the presidential administration. The force suffers from structural weaknesses in its force design and training system that created operational and tactical frictions

89/x Nevertheless, the #Russian armed forces have already demonstrated that they are able to learn and adapt. They remain highly lethal, determined to achieve the mission set by their president, and employing highly capable weapons systems.

90/x Report conclusions on #Russia AF: 1. The air force and navy are subordinated to the ground force: "it is evident that Russian jointery functions as a hierarchy in which the Navy and VKS are subordinated to the Ground Force’s needs."

91/x 2. "#Russian Force Generation is Not Aligned with its Concepts of Operation". Essentially: BTG is a non-functional concept, support elements are lacking, staff insufficient. Overall, junior leaders are lacking.

92/x 3. "The #Russian Military Has a Tendency to Reinforce Failure" "all instructions as valid until directly countermanded, and all intelligence as accurate unless contradicted" -> leads to repeated attempts of the same when failing.

93/x 4. "The Russian Military is Culturally Vulnerable to Deception". Systemic confirmation bias, lack of honest reporting, focus on single tasks reinforce this.

94/x 5. "Russian Forces Are Prone to Fratricide" "Russian air defences have regularly engaged friendly aircraft.
When Russian troops deviate from their assigned axes or the timing of their actions becomes desynchronised, they are often bracketed by their own artillery"

95/x I will still condense the RUSI recommendations for #UK, but I made my own conclusions of the operations in this separate thread and will make another with recommendations for #Finland

https://twitter.com/MikkoLaaksonen1/status/1598600627252248576

96/x My recommendations for #Finland. Spoiler alert: we are doing the right stuff, just need more #munitions.

https://twitter.com/MikkoLaaksonen1/status/1598611306868838401

97/x There Is No Sanctuary. The first clear lesson from the war in #Ukraine is that #Russia can conduct strikes on targets throughout its adversary’s operational depth with long-range precision fires

98/x For #Ukraine air force, the ability to conduct dispersed operations was critical to survivability. For ground forces, long-range precision strikes were used against their stockpiles, against training establishments and against maintenance facilities, which must be dispersed.

99/x Warfighting Demands Significant Slack Capacity - meaning there must be sufficient stocks and then production, training, logistics and maintenance capacities for wartime needs.

100/x Classic quote: "The oft-cited refrain of the #UK MOD that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside #NATO allies would be more credible if the situation were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in #Finland."

101/x #UAS and #CUAS Must Be Available Across All Branches and Echelons. Small drones for tactical units, medium for surveillance. Counter-UAS a specific concern.

102/x Fighting for the Right to Precision. Left uncontested, #EW slows kill chains, increases confusion and, perhaps most importantly, degrades precision. Attriting enemy precision capabilities or EW assets is critical in fighting for the right to precision

103/x Disperse, Dig Deep or Move Fast. #Ukraine forces usually dispersed, but in counterattacks they had to concentrate, and then movement speed was crucial. Static forces must dig deep.

104/104 END. @threadreaderapp unroll