This piece is confused. But there is a true (and uncontroversial) point behind it. 1/n
I suspect the piece is confused because it started off on a completely false premise.
That premise was torn apart by legal twitter (including me on this thread).
Fraser then, I guess, removed that claim from his piece: but that left the piece with a rather confusing and irrelevant diversion into Miller.
I think I can help: the point is really quite straightforward and appears on the face of Article 50.
Once Article 50 is triggered by a notification of intent, the *default* position if nothing else then happens is that the UK leaves on 29/3/19 with no deal.
The train is on a track leading to the no deal cliff.
There are though 2 ways off the track that are indisputably there in A50. One is a withdrawal agreement. The other is an extension of A50.
Neither however is under Parliament’s control: because neither is in the UK’s control. They require agreement of most of the EU27 + European Parlt (withdrawal agreement) or all of them (extension).
The third possibility is less obvious on the face of A50: revocation of the A50 notice. I and most other EU law experts believe that that can be done unilaterally. So that is under the UK’s (and therefore Parliament’s) control.
(See for example this by @piris_jc, referring to Lord Kerr.)
But leaving that possibility aside (and there is probably no majority in the House of Commons for revocation at this point) Fraser is right that Parliament cannot stop a no deal outcome.
The most Parliament can do is to direct the UK Government to go back to the negotiating table and if no deal has been reached by (say) October 2018.
That is the purpose of @SeemaMalhotra1’s amendment.
Seema explains the rationale for her amendment here.
As I explained above Parliament can’t stop “no deal”. The train set off when we triggered A50 and the default position is the cliff.
All it can do - and what @SeemaMalhotra1’s amendment does - is to force the Government back to the negotiating table if “no deal” (or an unacceptable deal) looks likely.
That may not work. But it could. And it’s (much) better than nothing.
And it’s a powerful signal that Parliament (and the pro deal and pro close relationship with EU majority) is in control, and not the hard Brexit minority who are grossly over-represented in the Cabinet/ends
