Thread by @yarbatman

1. #Trump is using sanctions and an information war to exacerbate domestic crises and to incite turmoil in #Iran, edging ever closer to an overt policy of regime change.

But here is the reality: regime change is not an alternative to reform in Iran.

bloomberg.com/view/articles/…

2. The many different kinds of regime change proponents—from monarchists to Marxists—share the belief that if you just get rid of the “mullahs” in Iran, the country will be able to solve its persistent challenges—the water crisis, chronic unemployment, human rights failures etc.

3. In my first piece for @bopinion, I explain why theories of regime change are institutionally + culturally ignorant. Proponents of regime change in Iran declare gradual reform to be “useless." But they fail to understand that they cannot escape the mantle of reform.

4. First, mullahs may *rule* Iran, but they do not *run* Iran. New work by @M_Boroujerdi + @kouroshrkhani on the political composition of the Islamic Republic makes this clear. Look to the historical representation of clerics in cabinets + parliament. Iran is run by bureaucrats!

5. What this means is that the roots of most of Iran’s economic crises and social injustices are institutional, not ideological. Any new government in Iran would inherit these institutions—ministries, agencies, state enterprises—and would need to reform them gradually.

6. Institutional inertia is incredibly difficult to overcome, even in the face of major political transformations. @JeffDSachs has done seminal work in this area. Why have Eastern European economies lagged behind East Asia despite undergoing more drastic kinds of regime change?

7. Sachs shows convincingly that is is because Eastern Europe had a greater level of institutional development and a larger welfare state, making economic restructuring more fraught. This is *exactly* the problem the Rouhani administration has faced as it pursues liberalization.

8. There is also the role of culture. Many ingrained behaviors in Iran emerged largely in response to institutional failures. Why do Iranian police solicit bribes? Both because of poor rule of law, but also because of a mindset where individuals seek to put themselves first.

9. Many regime change proponents in the diaspora claim that returnees, many of whom have succeeded in their adopted countries, will bring the management acumen Iran needs at state level. Perhaps no one is more taken by this fantasy than @PahlaviReza, son of Iran’s deposed Shah.

10. But the experience of returnees in Iraq is a cautionary tale. @zalali’s major study of Iraq's failed political transition includes this compelling passage, which seems to foreshadow how Iranian returnees would likewise buckle in the face of institutional and cultural inertia.

11. In effect, without mastering reform and its slow, grinding processes, regime change is not just risky, it is completely unsound. Regime change proponents have done stunningly little thinking about how they would work to rebuild Iran after a dramatic political transition.

12. This is what makes the outright dismissal of reform as “impossible” or "useless" so dangerous. It is a cop out. Regime changers cast aside the obligation to explain what happens the day after their cathartic revenge on the mullahs.

13. Not only that, but rather than to seek the solidarity that any political movement needs, proponents of regime change instead often undermine those who are right now driving practical reform on the ground. After all, their successes disprove the impossibility of reform.

14. First, the travails of activists in Iran are used to justify regime change narratives but their hard-won progress in driving domestic reforms is cast as futile. @AzadehMoaveni’s excellent @NewYorker piece on Iranian feminism is testament to this.
newyorker.com/news/news-desk…

15. Second, those who returned to Iran after the nuclear deal to engage Iran’s economy and to generate jobs, find themselves pilloried as seeking to enrich the regime. All this while Iran’s economic malaise is cynically used as evidence of the futility of reform.

16. That many regime change proponents have responded to the demise of the Iran nuclear deal and the reimposition of US sanctions with apathy is especially disgraceful given the real harms being felt by the Iranian public. What is the logic behind this @AlinejadMasih tweet?

17. My aim is not to disparage those who have a different political vision for #Iran. I respect their feelings + their pain. My aim is to issue a challenge. If you are calling for regime change, you better be working harder than anyone to craft viable strategies for reform.

18. If you are a journalist, analyst, or politician engaging with regime change supporters, it is vital that you interrogate the question of reform as *fundamental* to calls for revolution. The quality of the answer you receive will tell you everything you need to know.

19. For decades, regime change proponents have monopolized the conversation. But they have brought nothing valuable to the discourse, have been exploited by politicians with no genuine sympathy for Iran, and have been apathetic to external pressures imposed on the Iranian people.

20. Regime change is not an alternative to reform. Nor is it the only acceptable political advocacy for diaspora Iranians. Iran is approaching a critical juncture and the Iranian people need their brothers + sisters outside of Iran to demonstrate a new and more useful solidarity.

21. In short, to reform Iran we must reform our advocacy. Regime change proponents ought to take stock.

22. inb4: "reformists" refers to a political party/movement, "reform" is a process of creating political change. You can reject #Iran's current crop of reformists (though I think that is premature) but still believe in the necessity of reform.