This tweet raises an important point, which gives perspective on all the brouhaha over the backstop.
The U.K. - including pro-Brexit politicians - has insisted that, as a matter of U.K. policy (and not just because Ireland wants this), there should be no change to the currently invisible Irish border.
There are excellent reasons of good neighbourliness, sensitivity to history, & concern for peace and security, why that should be so. Unlike other, consensual, borders in Europe (eg 🇫🇷/🇨🇭 or 🇸🇪/🇳🇴 ), this is a contested and controversial border, where visibility is problematic.
An invisible border requires, of course, the agreement of both sides: it takes two to tango, and two to operate an invisible border.
Both sides have to be comfortable that a combination of sufficient closeness in tax and regulatory regimes and/or efficient legal, administrative and technological systems and arrangements between the parties mean that the border can be left without infrastructure or checks.
Put the *UK* objective of an invisible border together with the need for both sides to agree, and you see that, for anyone who genuinely gives priority to the invisible border objective, the question of the backstop is really displacement activity.
The brute fact is that, in order to keep the border open, Ireland (and thus the EU), will have to be comfortable with the post-Brexit UK regime & with the legal/administrative/technological systems that will, as a result of that regime, be needed to maintain the invisible border.
If they are not, then the invisible border objective can’t be met. Whatever the backstop arrangements may be.
And, if your policy objective is to keep the border invisible because you value the contribution that makes to peace and security, it doesn’t really matter whose fault it is that the border stops being invisible.
So the debate about whose “fault” it would be if barriers went up is also displacement activity.
If you don’t want to be constrained by whether the EU/Ireland are sufficiently comfortable with post-Brexit arrangements to keep the border invisible, then there is only one consistent position to adopt.
That position is @andrew_lilico’s: i.e. that the invisible border (and the peace and security it entails) is not, in fact, a policy priority compared to the form of Brexit you want. In short, you prioritise freedom to do trade deals or reduce tariffs.
It’s a position. I happen to think it’s a profoundly unattractive one, and inconsistent with our obligations to, and deep ties of friendship with, Ireland and its people. But at least it’s consistent.
Which is more than can be said for those who mouth warm words about the importance of keeping the invisible border, while complaining about backstop provisions that really do no more than reflect the necessary consequences of those warm words in legal text. /ends
