Trump’s decision to withdraw forces from Syria sheds light on Netanyahu’s U.S. strategy and wishful thinking. To secure DC’s JCPOA withdrawal and embassy relocation to Jerusalem, Netanyahu embraced Trump, repeatedly depicting him as the most pro-Israeli U.S. president ever. 1/
It is no coincidence the PM did not even hint criticism of DC’s policies since Trump entered White House. The medium term US-Israel implications are known: Netanyahu’s uncritical embrace of Trump contributed greatly to eroding bi-partisan consensus in Congress around Israel. 2/
But the recent decision underlines that the short terms implications for US-Israel relations deserve urgent attention. This choice robbed Israel of weighty leverage over U.S. decision making, which it has used toward both Republican and Democrat Presidents. 3/
Having idealized Trump’s commitment to Israel, Netanyahu now seems effectively unable to potently criticize his decisions. This was the case when Trump ended covert aid to Syrian rebels in mid-2017, which accelerated Assad’s victories, notably for Israel in South West Syria. 4/
And now again Netanyahu avoids any criticism of Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria, even though he clearly lobbied not just for the U.S. to keep its forces in Syria but rather to increase their size and role. 5/
This stance would also weaken Netanyahu’s hand when presented a US Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plan. Repeatedly glorifying Trump’s decisions on final status issues (Jerusalem, UNRWA, etc) effectively conveyed DC can legitimately arbitrate between Israel and the PLO. 6/
There seems to be a sharp contrast with previous Israeli PMs, who sought to keep the US as a mediator rather than an arbiter and kept the freedom to publicly criticize DC’s policies when these strongly threatened Israeli interests. 7/
Syrian developments suggest Netanyahu mismanaged the relationship with both global superpowers. Trump effectively subordinates his Syria objectives to his Iran objectives. If only because Israel shares a border with Syria, this cannot simply be endorsed. It could mean war. 8/
Israel now needs to prepare for a scenario in which Idlib falls to the hands of Assad and Tehran turns its attention – and the Shia militias it backs - to Syria’s South West. This could happen as soon as early 2019. 9/
The character of Israel-U.S. relations and Trump’s fickle decision making pattern suggest another U.S. gambit would be risky for Israel. It seems urgent for Israel to repair relations with Russia and attempt to establish via Moscow an Israeli-Iranian modus vivendi in Syria. 10/
