Thread by @RWynJones

Unexpectedly, the 1997 referendum on Welsh devolution is back in the news.

Setting aside Theresa May's misremembering/rank hypocrisy [delete according to taste] concerning her own and her own party's position, the lesson of Wales 1997 is actually about 'loser's consent' 1/

Welsh devolutionists (led by Ron Davies) fully realised that there was a real legitimacy question resulting from the very narrow referendum result. They worried about it, thought about and got people like myself to brief them about it in pretty lurid terms 2/

And to the extent that these things are possible, they deliberately set about trying to generate 'loser's consent' for the result.

* By involving opponents of devolution in discussions about the internal processes that would be adopted in the new National Assembly 3/

* By being unusually cross-party in their approach during the parliamentary passage of what became the 1998 Government of Wales Act (kudos here to the Wales
Office team of Ron Davies, @PeterHain and Win Griffiths)

4/

In other words, they realised that the referendum result was only a fragile mandate on which to build a new constitutional dispensation for Wales. That mandate had to be shored up. Undergirded. Supported.

5/

And the only way to do that was to be cross-party and to do what they could to reach out to and address the concerns of their opponents.

It helped, of course, that this approach 'went with the grain' of that particular ministerial team. There were also willing interlocutors

6/

But the fundamental point was that they realised that the narrowness of the referendum result meant that they simply had to make every effort to build consent among those who had been opposed as well as those who just hadn't bothered to participate in the vote.

7/

It goes without saying that they almost certainly didn't get everything right. With the benefit of hindsight, there are things that might have been done differently. "Heb ei fai heb ei eni", as we say in Welsh.

8/

But this was a notably inclusive, non-sectarian approach.

And it succeeded. By 1999 - Indeed before the National Assembly first met - opposition to devolution had fallen substantially from the levels of 1997. Two decades later it bumps along at about 10-15% of the electorate

9/

Rather the story of public attitudes towards Welsh devolution has become that the Welsh population tend to want more of it (though not independence) even as the powers of the National Assembly expand.

Loser's consent was obtained and Wales has moved on to other questions

10/

At risk of labouring this, is seems to me that the contrast between post 1997 Wales and post 2016 UK could hardly be starker. But not in the way Theresa May wants to claim.

May's government has made practically no effort to secure the consent of those who voted Remain

11/

A narrow referendum mandate was regarded as giving carte blanche.

Remoaners; Saboteurs: Remainers were simply meant to suck it up whilst the fantasies of the Brexiteers were indulged (those idiotic 'red lines')

And guess what, loser's consent has never been forthcoming

12/

Loser's consent has not been forthcoming in part because Theresa May and her government has made absolutely no attempt to generate it.

The lesson of the 1997 referendum is pretty much the exact opposite of the one that May is touting and reflects terribly on her

DIWEDD/FIN

BONUS If you're interested in what happened in Wales then copies of this by @roger_scully and myself are no doubt still available. See Chapter 2, especially. Oh, and apologies for the various infelicities of grammar (etc.) in the above. Ych a fi!