,
3 tweets,
1 min read
Read on Twitter
Yeah, this is a good example of the insight of the game theory concept of “subgame perfection.”
Which teaches us:
Dems couldn’t give Trump wall $, even if requires burning more $ than he is demanding.
B/c if give $, T would be incentivized to make more such demands in future.
Which teaches us:
Dems couldn’t give Trump wall $, even if requires burning more $ than he is demanding.
B/c if give $, T would be incentivized to make more such demands in future.
(Same insight explains why Hatfields and McCoy’s or Israel And Palestine can’t just let bygones be bygones, and are stuck in cycles of violence, even if both may wish to forgive and forget. Also explains why England had to fight expensive & useless war defending Falkland Islands)
(And why punishing in the ultimatum game makes complete sense, if you think about ultimatum game as tapping into our sense of retributive justice, which evolved in contexts of repeated interactions to be consistent with subgame perfection.)
