Thread by @SharpFootball

The Super Bowl was lost before the game started
•Belichick's game plan modified his defense to counter LA's strength (more zone)
•McVay didn't adjust his offense to attack NE weaknesses

It was frustrating to watch but even more devastating to review the film & analyze. Thread:

Heading into the game, we knew:
• The Patriots were GREAT defending 11 personnel passes
• The Rams throw the most 11 personnel passes

But, we also knew:
• The Rams were actually MORE efficient passing from 12 personnel
• The Patriots ranked #3 vs 11 personnel but #26 vs 12.

So what did the Rams do to account for this?
• 36 dropbacks from 11, only 6 from 12
• Only 1 pass from 12 before 4:30 left in the 3rd qtr

Would more 12 have worked? Compare the efficiency on attempts from both groupings:
• 11: 5.6 YPA, 29% success
• 12: 8.8 YPA, 60% success

Unbelievable: A big story in the game was the pressure the Patriots were getting on Goff. That was largely because the Rams continued to pass from 11. It was truly remarkable that the 1st time they passed from 12 w both TEs blocking was 3:42 left in the 3rd qtr. TD, but for Goff.

The Rams used 12 personnel with both TEs blocking only 3 times the entire game:
-This should-have-been TD on 1st down
-16-yard completion on 1st down
-9-yard completion on 1st down

The Rams seemingly didn’t care that the Patriots were significantly better defending 11 personnel. McVay thought they could win by “doing what we do” and out-executing.

The Patriots, on the other hand, modified their entire strategy to capitalize on the Rams weaknesses.

The flaw in failing to attack more from 12 personnel likely cost the Rams the game. But there were other problems with the Rams offensive game plan.

The Rams needed to target RBs in the pass game. The Patriots ranked top-10 in YPA & success to WRs & TEs. Much worse vs RBs.

LA didn't have a single target to a non-WR in the first half.

LA threw just one early-down target to Todd Gurley all game (4th qtr).

LA threw 3 early-down targets to C.J. Anderson, but not until 4:30 left in the 3rd qtr.

A critical positional matchup edge wasn't explored.

Another huge element of this game was play action.

The Rams absolutely needed to use play action early and often.

Goff was significantly better with play action. And as importantly, the Patriots customarily do not get to the QB as much when the offense uses play action.

LA used play action (PA) on 35% of dropbacks YTD. I thought they should up that %.

They used it on 24% in the Super Bowl (17% from 11 personnel).

Results from 11?

No play action:
•5.3 YPA, 33% success, 3 sacks, 1 INT

With play action:
•7.2 YPA, 50% success, 0 sacks, 0 INT

Looking only at early downs, from both 11 and 12 personnel, here were the play action splits:

No play action:
•38% success, 6.5 YPA, 2 sacks, 1 INT (10% sack rate)

With play action:
•56% success, 7.6 YPA, 0 sacks, 0 INT

I've heard the Patriots "took away play action"... that would mean using play action in the 2nd half didn't work any more. But actually, 2nd half only, all downs:

No play action:
• 39% success, 6.5 YPA, 2 sacks, 1 INT

With play action:
• 60% success, 8.0 YPA, 0 sacks, 0 INT

What about tempo? This was a big question before this game. How often would the Rams go fast?

We know the NE def called 2 plays & switched late in the play clock. Why didn't McVay go fast to combat this? Remember, NE didn't face many fast offenses this year & LA was #1 in pace.

Here's a look at the seconds remaining on the play clock when the Rams snapped the ball (ignoring plays out of timeouts).

18 plays snapped inside of 5 seconds on play clock.
•1.4 yards/play plus an INT.

5 plays snapped w 1 sec:
•0.2 yards/play

Played right into NE's hands.

LA also needed to ensure they weren't losing efficiency by calling suboptimal run plays. The Patriots vulnerability to runs from 11 personnel was something I discussed last season & was still an issue this year.

Pre-game, my thoughts on how LA should optimize their run game:

On early downs (17 of 18 runs were on early downs), the Rams used 11 personnel on only 59% of run attempts.

LA used 11 personnel to run on 82% of run attempts YTD.

In biggest game of the yr, despite the need to run from 11, LA ran from 12 at their 2nd highest rate of the yr.

The Rams recorded more YPC when running outside zone from 11 personnel (9.0 YPC, 50% success) but ran outside zone from 12 personnel twice as often (4 times). These 12 personnel runs plays gained just 2.8 YPC.

There is a difference between game plan & adjustments. Belichick did both. The Rams should have game planned more 12 personnel passes. They didn't. But after seeing the O-line struggle vs just 4 & 5 man rushes, why didn't LA adjust & use 12 much earlier for the extra blocking?

This should not take anything away from the NE defense.

But there was a major opportunity missed by LA in creating their gameplan & adapting in-game.

Passing from 12 worked...
Play action worked...
Tempo worked...
Running from 11 worked...

but all were underutilized.

This thread became an article: sharpfootballanalysis.com/blog/2019/why-…
Belichick's gameplan reminded me of this: "When Napoleon was asked what principles of war he followed, he replied that he followed none. His genius was his ability to respond to circumstances...he was a supreme opportunist"