Thread by @d_jaishankar

Lot of people criticising this piece in the @nytimes, but my biggest problem is that it very much oversimplifies why India sometimes has antiquated defence platforms. nytimes.com/2019/03/03/wor…

India is the largest defence importer since 2013, almost 50% more than 2nd placed Saudi Arabia. Exports (other than offshore patrol vessels) are negligible. Yet, India still has 180,000 people working in its defence industry, 9 DPSUs, 41 ordnance factories, and 52 defence labs.

So why the obvious problems? A few reasons:

First, state defence sector monopolies created after 1951 remain powerful, with the acquisitions system designed to prioritise them. Private sector alternatives only arose after 2001, and that too gradually.

Second, license production of defence equipment has not been accompanied by technological absorption, particularly important in an era of complex, networked systems (although Indian industry has started fulfilling certain roles at the lower technology levels).

Third, corruption - both real and perceived - leads to consistent delays and a reluctance to take decisions. This has been true since 1979.

Fourth, the defence services want the (1) highest quality, at (2) the lowest cost, in (3) the shortest time frame. Realistically, one of those will have to be sacrificed for the other two. The services' qualitative requirement thus often have unrealistic expectations.

Fifth, defence spending - particularly capital expenditure - remains susceptible to budgetary cuts and deliberate delays in order to address fiscal deficits and increase room for social spending. That uncertainty deters innovation and long-term planning.

It's not as if these problems are not known or understood. A large number of internally-commissioned government reports identify these and other similar problems. But the reasons they have not been acted upon (except incrementally) are essentially political.