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The GRU "installed malware on the [voting technology vendor] network".
To be clear, this could well be game over in terms of compromise of any voting machine software -- even that not connected to the Internet. The default assumption: This supply chain was compromised.
To be clear, this could well be game over in terms of compromise of any voting machine software -- even that not connected to the Internet. The default assumption: This supply chain was compromised.
If the internal vendor network was compromised it is quite possible the software used in the actual machines was compromised. Depending on the details of their internal security -- which is not public information. And it doesn't matter here that the voting machines didn't...
...connect to the Internet directly; the malware on the vendor's network could allow compromises to be introduced into regular system updates and security patches, well in advance of the election.
I've worked at a software company whose internal network was compromised by a state level actor once. I saw the security measures added afterwards. I know there were extensive audits of all software and systems to ensure they were clean. Was that done at [REDACTED] company?
(The vendor is VR Systems, pretty clearly.)
