Thread by @walkafyre

1/ THREAD: OK folks, about to go on a long-winded theory here... I will back up with sources along the way, but there may be a few leaps along the way. Of course, the best way to disprove a theory is peer-review, so any and all comments appreciated:

September 2015. MYE is underway, team assembled, evidence has been collected. A Cyber Division "IA" "supports" the investigation beginning 9/9/15 through 10/30/15. During his tenure, he searches various FBI databases for information related to email addresses from HRCs accounts

Interestingly, it appears his searches included FISA databases. Note the classification heading after NOFORN is still redacted as "Secret"; this is where the dissemination marking would be located, and "FISA" fits, and I can't find another dissemination control that would work.

Additionally, there is a huge redacted portion of the EC before even the "Details" section; this is called the "FISA Warning" that is required on documents with FISA-derived information included. dni.gov/files/document…

I'm not sure why our Analyst leaves at end of Oct. Is it important? Maybe, maybe not. Also a question - WHERE is our analyst located? This IS important - later.

On March 9, 2016 (a date well known to #Spygaters out there), another Cyber Analyst notices that an Intelligence Bulletin authored on Oct 29 2015 was never added to the case file. She helpfully memorializes the IB and database search results (MYE Serial Cyber-5).

However, this turns out to be...not so helpful. It turns out, our original Analyst was not supposed to have access to FISA databases! As Lisa Page would say, this was quite the "f-up."

Our original analyst was (I'm guessing) working for a "fusion center." Fusion centers are collaborations between federal, state, local, and tribal officials along with private sector entities. They allow for faster information sharing between entities for combating threats.

After 9/11, information-sharing became a high priority for intel agencies. And that's not *necessarily* bad. Like the blind men describing different parts of the elephant, without seeing the whole picture a single agency can't make real-time determinations that can save lives.

However, security vs. privacy is a trade-off. We want FISA authority for the gov't, but only if they use it against the bad guys. We also don't want them sharing FISA info, until after a terrorist act and we say "why didn't you do something if you knew?"

But I digress. Analyst #2 has now documented that Analyst #1 had access to FISA info for his searches. This sets off alarm bells. Thus begins the FISA Court's finger-wagging at the FBI, per it's April 26, 2017 Opinion.

Note the highlighting in the above screenshot - "disclosing" and "access"; this is different than the NSA "about" queries, and also says nothing about improper use of the information. It's been assumed someone accessed the data ON Mar 9, but that's not necessarily the case.

It's unclear what type of access these contractors had. The Opinion refers to an "interagency memorandum of understanding" that was entered into prior to 2016. Researching this is a monumental undertaking. A major info-sharing MOA was entered into in 2003. There are several...

...others entered into since then - between FBI and State, FBI and DHS, FBI Joint Task Forces, FBI Cyber Cells, FBI Field Intelligence Groups, FBI and fusion centers, and others that have yet to be uncovered. It's still not clear which MOA the FISC is referring to.

I have a guess, however. In March 2017 (a month before the FISC Opinion), the IGs of DHS, DOJ, and the IC released a report about sharing of Counterterrorism Information. They discuss how DHS contractors/personnel had difficulty accessing FBI space, so FBI waived security reqs

In other words, fusion center PERSONNEL with NON-FBI CLEARANCE (i.e., DHS clearance) had ACCESS to FBI information.

This is a FASCINATING transcript of a conference call among members of the State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Policy Advisory Committee on July 26, 2017. There are other tidbits in there for those who want to read the whole thing: archives.gov/files/isoo/ove…

More transcript:

Thanks a lot, Analyst #2. Not only have you caused issues with MYE, but now you've potentially busted a hole in the underlying info-sharing structure that has been built upon since 2003 (or before). This could have potential to become a HUGE scandal, depending on how media spins.

So what to do? Call in the man who helped spearhead the inter-agency sharing structure - former FBI Director Robert Mueller. Mueller and Zebley (who also represented Justin Cooper during MYE) visited the White House on April 13, 2016, for unknown reasons.

Was this to alert him of a possible major data-collection/sharing issue? "You started this, you're going to have to fix it"? (This Mueller connection is a leap, I know; but I like it in context of my narrative)

This also explains why both sides of the aisle have sometimes been cagey about releasing a lot of the FISA/surveillance information. Even the R's don't want their side to demand a complete dismantling of the security apparatus that's in place.

The FISC Opinion was dated April 26, 2017. Look what else happened that date:

HR2169 eventually died in the Senate, but this was/is obviously a bipartisan concern. And you have to laugh to keep from crying when you see how they try to fix it - by passing vague language allowing the administrative state to secretly fix it.

I've several "spin-off" theories related to this narrative, but still needing organizing (in my head and in Twitter-thread format). For now I hope this can point folks towards additional rabbit holes for digging, and I'd appreciate comments/critiques of this current theory. /END