Thread by @ALanoszka

THREAD:

It's finally here ... on Friday evening no less: the Department of Defence's long-awaited Indo-Pacific Strategic Report (#IPSR: link: media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/20…).

Here are a few things noteworthy to me as someone interested in alliance politics and Europe.

1. Much here about the general value of alliances. It emphasises joint preparedness; notes how allies and partners are helpful for
achieving peace, deterrence, and interoperable warfighting capability; and argues for a networked approach to grasp local security relations.

2. The document expresses concern that China would leverage unequal economic relationships for coercive gain. It already sees such behaviour play out in Europe.

3. It endorses a whole-of-government approach for sustaining a free and open Indo-Pacific Region that involves working with partners such as the European Union.

4. The document paints Russia as a 'revitalised malign actor' that seeks influence and markets in Asia. Of note is that Russia tries to present itself as a "neutral third partner" while cultivating closer diplomatic, economic, and military ties with China.

5. On pages 15-16, it does finally articulate clearly U.S. national interests and goals in the region, but they are boilerplate: protect Americans and the homeland, promote American prosperity, preserve peace through strength, and advance American influence.

6. What is the force posture that the Pentagon envisions for the Indo-Pacific Region? Admittedly, the ideas presented sound sexy but are vague. The question for many is whether new commitments will come at the expense of others, and what trade-offs the DOD might face regionally.

7. Much love for Japan and quite a bit for South Korea, too. Taiwan also gets special mention before the document takes readers on a regional tour. Reading it, you do not get a sense of any of the surface tension that has marked many of these relationships with Trump as POTUS.

8. The document acknowledges the useful role played by the UK, France, and, to a lesser extent, Canada, more or less where writers of the document explain the importance of performing FONOPs. Which evidently are impartial because allies can make excessive maritime claims, too.

9. Anyway, the big question for me is one that is obviously too political to be addressed in this document: how will the United States manage potentially competing commitments in Europe and Asia? We shall see.

/END