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I'll be having a go at developing various aspects of this in the next couple of days. I'll start with the one which has attracted the most comment: whether Johnson will in fact opt for no deal in October rather than (as I suggest) take the risk of a GE. 1/
He has committed to Brexit (do or die) by Oct 31. A GE is likely to require an extension, which he refuses to countenance. There is considerable doubt over whether MPs can (at this late stage) legally force him to request an extension. 2/
So, he *could* attempt to force no deal through. My view is that, despite the above factors, he is likely to decide not to. Here are some reasons why. 3/
He only has a majority of 3 (soon likely to be 2). No deal would alienate many MPs. Much of the legislation needed for no deal would be impossible to pass through this Parliament. 4/
The likelihood of the UK being ready for no deal is vanishingly small. A lot of fanfare will be made of the preparations, and a lot of money will be spent. But one - rather important - aspect is, at best, uncertain. 5/
As the no deal notices which the Govt has produced make abundantly clear, many of the problems of no deal rely on some sort of arrangement, cooperation, or deal... with the EU. 6/
And, in order to get any sort of deal, the EU will want assurances relating to the divorce bill, citizens' rights, and the border between the UK and Ireland (the EU). 7/
That all goes to make the delivery of no deal very complex. Belief will not be enough. Difficult negotiations with the EU will not be avoided. All the while, PM Johnson's majority is wafer thin. 8/
A GE does of course present risks. But as argued in the thread, he may calculate that he has a chance of increasing his majority, winning power for 5 more years, and increasing his range of options. 9/
If one accepts the central thesis in the thread - that power matters more to Johnson than the shape of Brexit - he can assess again post the GE, depending on the Parliamentary arithmetic. 10/10
