I wrote a book on climate politics (comes out Jan). It goes DEEP into the weeds. But sometimes weeds hide important stuff we've forgotten about climate politics, perfect for occasional threads! Today: when carbon pricing nearly happened in first 100 days of George W Bush admin 1/
On March 13th, 2001, Bush infamously wrote to the Senate to clarify his opposition to 1) the Kyoto Protocol, and 2) limits on US carbon pollution. Most accounts of climate policymaking under President Bush start here. Then tackle Kyoto withdrawal, climate denialism, etc. 2/ 
This makes it seem like our climate was doomed as soon as the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Gore. But Bush's letter was not the beginning. Instead, it was the end point of intense climate policy debate during the early days of his administration 3/
During the election, Gore had struggled with how to profile his environmentalists credentials, squeezed by Nader from one side and Bush the other. Just read this tortured NYT article on environmental debates from just before election day: nytimes.com/2000/11/03/us/… 4/
Ultimately, both Bush and Gore promised to implement emissions trading if elected. For Bush, this was going to be part of a multipollutant (4P) bill that would cover four sources: NOX, SOX, mercury and carbon pollution
c-span.org/video/?c448813… 5/
c-span.org/video/?c448813… 5/
Nor was this empty rhetoric. Emissions trading was included in Bush transition docs. As late as March 2001, his EPA administrator recommitted the US to carbon pricing at a G8 environment meeting in Italy, with approval from Bush’s National Security Advisor and chief of staff 6/
Anticipating that, no matter the election result, there would be momentum on a 4P strategy, senators on the Environment and Public Works Committee began work on 4P legislation in fall 2000. Negotiations were boosted by ongoing federal lawsuits against coal-fired power plants 7/
Why? As part of the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments, Congress established that existing pollution sources needed to undergo a “New Source Review” (NSR) after substantial modifications. 8/
Between 1998 and 2000, the Clinton administration filed almost two dozen lawsuits against utility companies, claiming they had made serious facility changes without requesting a NSR, under the cover of routine maintenance. 9/ heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPag…
Business wanted relief from this policy stick. So Senate 4P negotiations explored a bargain to legislate restrictions on the four pollutants in return for Clean Air Act regulatory relief, including from NSR provisions. 10/
By March of 2001, the contours of a deal had been agreed by the top two Republicans and top two Democrats on the Senate Environment Committee. Under the deal, carbon pollution would be managed through an emissions trading scheme, with a cap declining over 20 years. 11/
The Senate deal was negotiated without stakeholder consultation; it was set to be announced in early March 2001 when, surprising principals in both parties, Bush reversed his support for carbon pollution’s inclusion in the bill. 13/
What happened? Senior business officials, anti-climate Republicans (e.g. Cheney) all became concerned with climate policymaking momentum and forced an internal review of the proposal. Hence, Bush's Senate letter. 14/
The rest is history: with Bush’s announcement, the Senate bargain fell apart before it could be announced. And it angered both Democrats and pro-environment Republicans, including Oregon’s Gordon Smith, who had strongly supported the deal. 15/
Legislative proposals for a multi pollutant deal with carbon continued, but w/o real prospects. The apex came when 4P bill passed from committee in June 2002 on a 10-9 vote, with Dem. Max Baucus voting against but Rep. Lincoln Chafee co-sponsoring 16/ eenews.net/stories/10050
But mostly 4P policies became 3P policies, with an exclusive focus on NOX, SOX, and mercury as part of Bush's Clear Skies Initiative. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clear_Ski… In turn, Congressional actors pivoted to stand-alone carbon pricing bills. 17/
The 2001 private Senate deal was perhaps the last, best hope for an incremental bipartisan piece of climate legislation - and at a time when incrementalism might still have worked. It also gives us a window into what a carbon price under Gore might have looked like. 18/
And it reminds us that support for and opposition to US climate policymaking used to cut across party lines. Narratives of US climate inaction obscure repeated efforts to impose costs on carbon polluters. If the past was so contingent, perhaps the future can be too. /fin
