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1/
NEWS: WTO to authorize US tariffs on $8 billion of EU exports due to illegal subsidies provided to Airbus, report @BBaschuk @SDonnan & J Stearns
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News is the $8bn number
The $8 bn would be the biggest authorized retaliation in WTO history...
bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
NEWS: WTO to authorize US tariffs on $8 billion of EU exports due to illegal subsidies provided to Airbus, report @BBaschuk @SDonnan & J Stearns
___
News is the $8bn number
The $8 bn would be the biggest authorized retaliation in WTO history...
bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/
The largest PRIOR WTO authorized retaliation was $4 billion.
That was the "US - Foreign Sales Corporation" (FSC) dispute of 2002 that the EU won and was authorized to retaliate against the US...
--> chadpbown.com/wp-content/upl…
The largest PRIOR WTO authorized retaliation was $4 billion.
That was the "US - Foreign Sales Corporation" (FSC) dispute of 2002 that the EU won and was authorized to retaliate against the US...
--> chadpbown.com/wp-content/upl…
3/
Once the report is public, we'll see HOW the arbitrators came up with the $8 billion limit.
Historically, depending on the type of dispute, arbitrators have focused on one of two approaches.
I describe the different ways in this paper... 🤓🤓🤓
-> chadpbown.com/wp-content/upl…
Once the report is public, we'll see HOW the arbitrators came up with the $8 billion limit.
Historically, depending on the type of dispute, arbitrators have focused on one of two approaches.
I describe the different ways in this paper... 🤓🤓🤓
-> chadpbown.com/wp-content/upl…
4/
In disputes over DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES or IMPORT RESTRICTIONS (eg, tariffs) arbitrators typically use the "trade effects" approach.
They estimate the level of lost trade and permit a country like the US to impose tariffs (of say 100%) to reduce trade by an equivalent amount...
In disputes over DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES or IMPORT RESTRICTIONS (eg, tariffs) arbitrators typically use the "trade effects" approach.
They estimate the level of lost trade and permit a country like the US to impose tariffs (of say 100%) to reduce trade by an equivalent amount...
5/
In disputes over EXPORT SUBSIDIES, the arbitrators typically allow retaliation equal to the value of the export subsidy.
Earlier examples: US - FSC, Canada - Aircraft, Brazil - Aircraft
In disputes over EXPORT SUBSIDIES, the arbitrators typically allow retaliation equal to the value of the export subsidy.
Earlier examples: US - FSC, Canada - Aircraft, Brazil - Aircraft
6/
Here is the full paper
Bown, CP and M Ruta, “The Economics of Permissible WTO Retaliation,” in CP Bown and J Pauwelyn (eds.), The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010
-> chadpbown.com/wp-content/upl…
Here is the full paper
Bown, CP and M Ruta, “The Economics of Permissible WTO Retaliation,” in CP Bown and J Pauwelyn (eds.), The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010
-> chadpbown.com/wp-content/upl…
