Thread by @pmdfoster

So how did @BorisJohnson pull off the 'pivot' to his revised Northern Ireland-only 'frontstop' - it's the weekend so here is a 3,000 word long read charting an incredible journey. /1 Thread

telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/…

@BorisJohnson The end - though we didn't know it - was in the beginning.

Per sources, as @BorisJohnson was taking office, there were briefings in 70 Whitehall (DexEU) for in coming officials, including @DavidGHFrost who was to become sherpa.

Solutions and fixes were mooted. /2

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost Per sources, the solutions, respecting all EU/UK redlines, included time limits, exit mechanims and hybrid customs solutions like those proposed in May 2018 by NI civil service.

They were put in a memo and.../3

bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northe…

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost They were rejected - "didn't fit the politics" of the hardline Johnson leadership campaign which narrowed options.

The choice was to go 'do or die' for abolition of backstop - and kick away any compromises (time limits, exit mechanism etc) /4

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost This was despite outreach by EU embassies to @DavidGHFrost and others in Team Johnson NOT to slam shut the doors. But slam they did in @BorisJohnson opening statemetn to commons on July 25 /5

gov.uk/government/spe…

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost By this time @RaoulRuparel and other top May advisers had quit over 'abolition' strategy, seeing this was - as Geoffrey Cox warned Johnson in Aug 1 XS meeting, per my report - a "complete fantasy" and a road to a 'no deal' /6

https://twitter.com/pmdfoster/status/1168641286292824064?lang=en

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel This approach was partly driven by politics but also be belief from @DavidGHFrost and others a) that 'alternative arrangements' really could fix border issue if enough pressure was applied b) the @Policy_Exchange view that this didn't undermine Good Friday Agreement. /7

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange So, how did we get from this very hardline position to the @BorisJohnson meeting with @LeoVaradkar in the Wirral in which Johnson junks the 'tech solutions' to border - and Varadkar concedes need for a consent mechanism: this was the intellectual fulcrum for the deal. /8

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar It starts with the series of reversals the Johnson Team suffered between that July 25 statement and the October 8 phone call with Angela Merkel at which @BorisJohnson finally accepts that EU won't accept border checks, or throw Ireland under bus /9

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar - the Benn Act
- the loss of 21 MPs
- the realisation Labour would block election
- the Supreme Court verdict ruling proroguation unlawful

...in the end Johnson totally boxed in. Trapped. So what to do?? /10

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar Many assumed (me included) that Johnson would NOT do the pivot - even though it was repeatedly pointed out that an NI-only solution was the only option open to him.

The feeling (I shared) was that he'd go pell mell for an election, get majority, come back and do deal. /11

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar This was wrong. I never believed Johnson would do 'no deal' (the reality is just too self-defeating) I just didn't see that he feared it sufficiently to pivot pre-election. This was a brave political move in my view. Credit to him. /12

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar Because out of the chaos of that July 25-October 8 period, there were the kernels of political possibility emerging as all the key players kept their cool, setting up the conditions for the eventual deal. /13

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar For the EU the Benn Act (and loss of Tory rebels) meant they could come to the table, able to walk away in knowledge that failure = extension, not no deal. It also took DUP out of equation to some degree. Recall the Rebels wanted a deal - just not at risk of no deal. /14

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar At the same time Irish-UK links were being kept going. @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid Eddie Lister all plugging away, and when Johnson/Varadkar met in Dublin it was cordial. No empty lectern hysterics. And chemistry too, per officals. /15

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid At same time EU leaders kept up massive pressure - all on same script - that customs checks in Ireland could NOT deliver solutinos.

This was message at UN General Assembly. And then, when Johnson wanted to travel to capitals days later, they all said 'don't bother'. /16

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid BUT in the background doors were left open.

At UNGA Johnson suggested meet "somewhere neutral" in a couple of weeks, which had Irish officials joking about where could be more neutral than UN HQ?! /17

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid At same time - as @Mij_Europe and others reported - Johnson's behaviour in his August meets with Merkel/Macron and performance at Biarritz G7 (no pandering to Trump) had convinced Merkel in particular Johnson DID want a deal /18

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe So why pressure was kept on with customs question, there was also quiet acknowledgement that the original 2018 backstop did have democratic legitimacy issues - there was recognition of UK concerns on consent. /19

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe SO here was the germ of a deal, with both sides hinting at their possible compromise

- the UK started to admit NI could be treated differently with SPS regime

- the EU that a consent mechanism was worth discussing

That was the space. Q was how to access? /20

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe A Johnson phone call with @JunckerEU in which he said that he was open to NI being simply "de jure" in UK customs territory - a clear sign that a border in Irish Sea was possible. This was increased by Oct 2 UK formal proposal which conceded ALL goods in NI would align with EU/21

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe @JunckerEU Indeed the UK Oct 3 'two borders, for four years' proposal was so "mad" it opened door to customs solution in Irish Sea, since if you've conceded N-S on regs, the next step is surely on customs too.

The consent proposal (DUP Veto) was cleary a no-go, but opened a door /22

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe @JunckerEU Then things started to happen on both fronts after Merkels Oct 8 phone call with Johnson that NO 10 briefed had made a deal "impossible".

On the contrary - the penny dropping with Johnson turned political key on a deal. /23

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe @JunckerEU On Oct 9 @RaoulRuparel (the may adviser who quit) wrote a piece in politico 'reminding' everyone about those dual-track customs plans... and guess what? When you bounced the idea off key member states, they didn't dismiss them. Mmmm. /24

politico.eu/article/opinio…

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe @JunckerEU Then Oct 9 @BrunoBrussels the Times's Brussels correspondent breaks story that EU side is toying with a cross-community consent mechanism that might work as a kind of exit mechanism. EU sources quickly disavowed - a sure sign a kite was being flown. /25

https://twitter.com/BrunoBrussels/status/1181845952392503296?s=20

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe @JunckerEU @BrunoBrussels Which brings us to the Wirral meeting where it seems

a) Johnson concede 'de jure' point on customs, opening door to Irish Sea solution
b) Varadkar opens way to a genuine consent mechanism that kills idea of NI being permanently trapped.

The backstop cd become a frontstop./26

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe @JunckerEU @BrunoBrussels The rest is a headlong dash to make the deal "operable" [ie a plan that cd work by Dec 31 2020 and EU cd trust] in time for the Oct 17 #EUCO which really meant @BorisJohnson agreeing to large elements of the Feb 2018 NI-only backstop. But it was done. /27

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe @JunckerEU @BrunoBrussels Of course, the saga had a bitter twist in the tail, which was that @duponline @DUPleader could not sign up to it - which leaves @BorisJohnson in the precarious position that he now finds himself in and stores up political trouble for the future. /28

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe @JunckerEU @BrunoBrussels @duponline @DUPleader So where does that leave us? We have a deal that

- creates no hard border in Ireland
- effectively takes 'no deal' off the table, I'd argue, since can't see Johnson credibly going back there after this
BUT
- opens door to hard brexit
- risks losing NI long term /29

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe @JunckerEU @BrunoBrussels @duponline @DUPleader Over to the politicians now, as to whether they can agree to put the deal over and then take up cudgels again over the shape of the future relationship, which is where the next fight lies. /30

@BorisJohnson @DavidGHFrost @RaoulRuparel @Policy_Exchange @LeoVaradkar @JulianSmithUK @sajidjavid @Mij_Europe @JunckerEU @BrunoBrussels @duponline @DUPleader FWIW this Johnson negotiation (like Cameron and May's) suggests that it will start with big talk, but gravity will take over.

A 460-million lb gorilla, meets a 65-millon lb gorilla - it's going to be a learning experience I fear. ENDS