Many historians of Japan discuss the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 as the triumph of Japan's modernisation while glossing over the actual military history.
I have been guilty of this myself... but a closer look shows just how precarious Japan's victories were. 1/
I have been guilty of this myself... but a closer look shows just how precarious Japan's victories were. 1/
The attack on Pyongyang in Sep. 1894 simply should not have worked. The Japanese attacked from the north, which meant that they had to cross the Taedong River.
But the Chinese did not attack the Japanese army as it was crossing the river; they waited in their fortifications. 2/
But the Chinese did not attack the Japanese army as it was crossing the river; they waited in their fortifications. 2/
And the Japanese were slow to cross the river because they had no pontoon bridges, so they would've been sitting ducks. 3/
Once the Japanese finally crossed the river and assaulted Pyongyang, the Chinese (who had up to that point simply waited for the Japanese assault) could not resist. 4/
Another good example comes with the naval Battle of the Yalu, where China lost four boats.
This was not because of Chinese weakness per se. Instead, they were supplied with the wrong ammunition. Had they had exploding shells, the outcome may have been quite different. 5/
This was not because of Chinese weakness per se. Instead, they were supplied with the wrong ammunition. Had they had exploding shells, the outcome may have been quite different. 5/
Moreover, the two main Chinese battleships were so much more advanced than their Japanese counterparts that they should've been more than a match for the majority of the Japanese navy. 6/
Yet another example comes with Gen. Nogi Maresuke's taking of Lushun in November.
His troops were ill prepared and did not have the proper grades and range of ammunition for their siege guns. The Chinese should have had the advantage here as well. 7/
His troops were ill prepared and did not have the proper grades and range of ammunition for their siege guns. The Chinese should have had the advantage here as well. 7/
Yet despite the precarious nature of Japan's continued victories, Yamagata Aritomo purportedly favoured a march on Beijing and the destruction of the Qing. Ito Hirobumi had to sack him to make sure no such attack happened. 8/
These are just a few examples of the risky, touch-and-go nature of Japan's first modern battles against the Qing Empire.
Had they not gone in Japan's favour, the history of East Asia would have been substantially different. 9/
Had they not gone in Japan's favour, the history of East Asia would have been substantially different. 9/
All these examples came from S.C.M. Paine's The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War (a book that feels misnamed, as the notion of grand strategy feels out of place).
It's a really interesting military history that's worth reading. END/
It's a really interesting military history that's worth reading. END/
