Thread by @LookNoFurther4

1 One of the changes that came to America after 9/11 was a heightened appreciation for inter-agency cooperation among intelligence gathering units spread throughout our federal government. Underpinning this cooperation lay mutual respect for agency expertise, coupled with...

2 ... the support, encouragement and secrecy of the president. We are made vulnerable when the president goes missing on this essential duty.

3 Trump's disparagement of our intelligence agencies is new in American history. There are countless examples of how well things used to work, when intelligence agencies were viewed as tools to advance the welfare of the nation.

4 One of my favorite stories, which was featured at Look No Further this past summer, is the story of Howard Hughes and the Glomar Explorer. It is hard to think of a better example of the president's trust in intelligence agencies working out so well.
And it is a cool story.

5 So begins the lesson. look.substack.com/p/that-time-we…

6 I March 1968, in the midst of this fear of nuclear war, came an opportunity for the U.S. to obtain and deconstruct a Soviet nuclear bomb and perhaps, obtain associated codes and technical guidance manuals. It was an opportunity to learn the enemy’s biggest secrets.

7 This opportunity came with the U.S. effort to salvage the wrecked Soviet nuclear submarine K-129, in a mission code named Project Azorian, but known to the public as the Glomar Explorer. It was an intelligence coup made possible by cooperation, trust and silence.

8 It started with signals intelligence. In April 1968, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence evaluated information concerning a Soviet Pacific Fleet surge deployment to the North Pacific Ocean that involved unusual search operations.

9 The Soviet search vessels were centered on a location known to be associated with Soviet strategic ballistic missile diesel submarine patrol routes. The U.S. concluded that the Soviet Pacific Fleet was searching for a lost nuclear submarine.

10 Soviet subs typically carried 3 nuclear missiles in an extended sail/conning tower. They routinely deployed to within missile range of the US west coast.The K-129 was 1 such sub. It was based at Rybachiy Naval Base, Kamchatka, and operated in the No Pacific Ocean.

11It was the K-129 that was missing.

12 The U.S. had deep ocean acoustic sensing devices in various locations in the Pacific Ocean that provided intelligence information about deep ocean activities.

13 These acoustic records indicated that a “good-sized bang” had occurred on Mar8, 1968, in the No Pacific & identified the probable location of the missing K-129.
The site, 1,560 nautical miles n/w of Oahu, was hundreds of miles away from the location of the Soviet naval search.

14 The Soviets did not have this deep ocean acoustic detection system and eventually gave up the search for the K-129, declaring it a loss with 98 crewmen killed.

15 The USS Halibut, a nuclear powered sub used for deep-ocean espionage against the USSR, identified the wreck of K-129 in Aug 1968. The K-129 lay at a depth of 16k ft. The Halibut took 20k close-up photographs of the wreck using special cameras that were lowered to great depth.

16 Salvaging the K-129 represented a unique opportunity for the US to obtain a Soviet nuclear missile & perhaps code books & other Soviet classified information. Nixon approved the salvage op in '70 &assigned it to the CIA, rather than the U.S. Navy, to maintain op secrecy.

17 The CIA Special Activities Division entered into a contract with Howard Hughes’ company, Global Marine Development, Inc., for the construction of the Hughes Glomar Explorer. Global Marine Development was a pioneer in deep-water offshore drilling operations.

18 No shipwreck had ever been salvaged from a depth of 16k fkt. The K-129 recovery opk would require the design & construction of a recovery vessel that could remain stationary on the ocean surface 3 miles above the salvage target on the ocean floor.

19As an operations cover story, Hughes told the media that the Glomar Explorer was being constructed to extract manganese nodules from the ocean floor. This cover story seemed a perfect match for Hughes’ reputation as an adventurous and highly successful engineer and entrepreneur

20 The Hughes Glomar Explorer arrived at the recovery site in the No Pacific on 7/4/74 & conducted salvage ops at the site for over a month. During this period, at least two Soviet ships visited the area but it is believed they didn't know what the Glomar Explorer was doing.

21 The K-129 lay in two sections on the ocean floor. The Hughes Glomar Explorer intended to raise the larger section, consisting of the forward 2/3 of the submarine (about 138 feet in length).

22 This portion contained the center sail section (conning tower) of the submarine and was thought likely to contain the nuclear missiles, code books and operational manuals.

23 The Glomar Explorer had a large mechanical claw, called Clementine, that was designed to be lowered to the ocean floor, grasp the targeted submarine section, and then lift that section into an opening in the floor of the ship's hold. This design allowed the entire salvage...

24 ...process to take place underwater, away from the view of other ships, aircraft, or spy satellites. As the salvage op commenced, the Glomar Explorer was able to lift the forward portion of the wreck off the ocean floor, but a mechanical failure in the claw occurred.

25 The forward portion of K-129 broke into two pieces and the sail area of the submarine and the center section fell back to the ocean floor. The exact portion of K-129 that the Glomar Explorer successfully recovered remains secret. I

26 There is no confirmation on whether code books or other operations manuals were recovered. The CIA filmed the entire salvage operation, but this videotape remains classified.

27 The bodies of six Soviet crewmen were recovered from the salvaged section of K-129. Due to radioactive contamination, their bodies were buried at sea in a steel chamber in Sept 1974, with full military honors. The DCI gave the CIA videotape of this ceremony to Russia in 1992.

28 The CIA released a report on the Glomar Explorer mission in 2010, but the report contains heavy redactions and has no photographs. Most of the information about the Glomar Explorer mission remains classified.

29 The expression, “we can neither confirm nor deny,” as a government “nonresponse,” [GLOMAR] grew out of frustrated attempts by journalists and researchers to learn more about the Glomar Explorer mission.

30 So ends the lesson.
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Our full Glomar report, with more maps and photos, is here: look.substack.com/p/that-time-we…