Thread by @Javanmardi75

How the 🇮🇱Israeli defense deals with the threat of #Hezbollah's precision missiles.
PART 3–
In its annual report, the Institute for National Security Studies placed the probability of war in #Lebanon in the first place, higher than the Iranian threat. 1

The latest name given by experts to this war, in publications and exercises, is "First Northern War" - assuming the war does not remain #Lebanese. #Syria (and possibly #Iraq) as well: 2

Syria itself may act against Israel to retaliate against Iran and Hezbollah for the generous assistance it provided during the civil war, and missile rockets may be fired from #Shiite militias from Iraq, and perhaps even by the #Houthis in Iran. 3

Apart from the statistical rockets, another threat from the north is the intrusion into Israeli territory. The thwarting of the #tunnel project severely damaged #Hezbollah's plans, but did not completely thwart them. 4

The organization's elite forces, #Radwan (as Imad Murnia is nicknamed), are preparing to carry out raids into Israeli territory in order to take over settlements or outposts. 5

The high walls that rise along the border, are intended to reduce the topographic advantage of those in #Lebanon and make it difficult for #Hezbollah to fire at #Israeli territory. 6

#Hezbollah has been investing in skimmers. Although it operated skimmers as early as the 2ed Lebanon War, it has come a long way since then and today has a wide range of small drones & skimmers of various types, including those carrying explosives for hundreds of kilometers. 7

The @IDF has quite a few ways to deal with this threat. One of them is activity on the spectrum (frequency blocking), which is supposed to disrupt and sometimes even intercept the attacking tool. The main challenge is how to do this without disrupting communication on our side.8

Above all these threats, in section First, from #IDF's point of view, is the Exact issue. It’s such a serious matter that the chief of staff & his deputy handle daily. This means ongoing discussions, plans & close monitoring of what is happening on both sides of the border. 9

The prevailing view in the @IDF at the moment is that the "accurate" threat is tolerable, and can be dealt with. Assuming that some precision missiles will still be able to penetrate, the question is what damage they will cause. 10

All this should lead to a magic number which should be Israel's #redline. A figure beyond which #Israel cannot counter & its crossing should launch #IDF into a preemptive strike, Knowing its price will be lower than a future war. So far, Israel has avoided such a number. 11

Some experts point to 500 accurate missiles, others to 1,000. As mentioned, #Hezbollah is still far from that, but the horizon is clear: it continues to produce and tries to smuggle. 12

Proponents of avoiding a clear statement of a #redline, believe that this is a dynamic reality, in the framework of which #Israel is accumulating various tools that change the picture & the account. The fear is that Israel will adapt itself every time to the new situation. 13

The prevailing opinion in the #IDF and among civilian experts is that #Israel must define its own red lines, and the fact that it has not yet done so is a serious malfunction that needs to be rectified soon. 14

#Hezbollah wants to reach such a mass of precision missiles, which will deter Israel from dealing with it. Apart from the #Iranian nuclear program, this is the biggest threat to Israel today. This is the incident. 15

If #Hezbollah crosses the threshold of quantity or quality, Israel will be required to act. It's a difficult decision, but Israel can not run away from it. In the meantime, they are trying to act in other creative ways that will not allow them to get there. 16

#Israel must define red lines for itself. Not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. For example, #Hezbollah's transition from smuggling kits to conversion to massive self-production in #Lebanon. 17

Israel need to mark a quantitative threshold and a qualitative threshold, the passage of which will oblige Israel to other actions. #Hezbollah is not there yet, but that may change soon. 18

The removal of economic #sanctions on #Iran, as part of the expected return to the nuclear deal, will also re-flow a lot of money to its sponsors in the region, led by #Hezbollah. 19

If #Tehran and #Beirut feel that the Americans are also restricting Israeli activity, or supporting it less, they may feel more confident in attacking the precision project and moving from tweezers work to extensive activity. 20

There are components in the preparations for a #Hezbollah missile attack that are not being handled properly - the most prominent of which is the state of defense in the north.
21

The 2017 government plan, the Civil Shield of the North, which was supposed to address the protection gaps in the north, has never been implemented, and more than half of the residents of the north have no security or shelter. 22

#Israel has never launched a preemptive strike on an enemy force building. The only exception is, of course, nuclear weapons: 23

Twice #Israel attacked nuclear reactors in the region - in 1981 in Iraq and in 2007 in Syria - as part of the Begin Doctrine, according to which an enemy state should not be allowed to develop nuclear technology. 24

Decisions about these attacks were complex, but determining the red line that required them was easy: a moment before the miners became "hot." 25

This thread continues..