Warum kein Embargo russischer Energie jetzt? 1. Die deutsche Begründung eines nur graduellen Ausstiegs aus russischen Gas- und Ölimporten ist widersprüchlich. Ein Embargo bereits heute könnte wahrscheinlich den Krieg schnell beenden. @Konflikt_Sicher@osteuropaverein@diegruenen
4. Der merkwürdige Defätismus und die löchrige Logik dieser Verhaltensweise legt den Verdacht nahe, dass hier partikulare Wirtschaftsinteressen und nicht nationale sowie europäische Sicherheitsinteressen vertreten werden. @pw_portal@ISPK_org@swud_org@StopFakeDE@MelnykAndrij
1. One of the strange features of #German-#Russian relations during the last 20 years was the physical contact of German politicians with #Putin & Co. To be sure, similar photographs of #VladimirPutin hugging Berlusconi, Modi, Macron, & other non-German leaders exist too.
2. But the range of politicians on both sides who, over the years, went beyond diplomatic handshakes is surprising. One suspects continuation of a #KGB practice in these physical approaches from the Russian side. @RusVerstehen@deruforum@russlandRU@TerekMedia@Konflikt_Sicher
3. Yet one wonders why various German politicians, like Matthias Platzek below, would allow or even initiate such embarrassing scenes with representatives of an authoritarian regime. Political instinct & expert advice should have warned German politicians against such encounters.
2. Western audiences are fed stories about escalating human-rights violations by Kyiv. The internal war propaganda instead is informed by the idea of standing up against a Western and Ukrainian assault on Russian cultural traditionalism. @4freerussia_org@vneshpol@russia_matters
3. Here individual human rights are to be limited rather than defended. Whereas #Putin presents Ukraine with reference to Germany's Nazis who annihilated homosexuals, #PatriarchKirill sees #gayparades in #Ukraine as an issue demanding Moscow's military intervention in the Donbas.
1. Arguably, #Russia's current war of imperial revanche started already in summer 2008. Some structural similarities between the Russian 2008 invasion of #Georgia and 2022 invasion of #Ukraine outweigh various surface dissimilarities. @SouthCaucasus@Caucasus_Watch@ccsiscenter
3. Had there been clearer signals and stronger material action by the West following the #Russian advances in #Georgia in August 2008 and in #Ukraine in March 2014, Moscow may not have dared to do what it has been doing to Ukraine, since February 2022. @pw_portal@FromRuswithWar
WHERE ON EARTH IS UKRAINE? A BRIEF REFLECTION ON RECENT GERMAN TALK SHOWS 1. No paradigm shift has yet happened in public German perceptions of the "#RussianWar:" For most politicians and commentators, #Ukraine keeps being far away. @UKRinDEU@GermanyinUA
2. Many #Germans subconsciously picture the war the following way. Of course, we are aware that formally #Ukraine is close. But, deep in our souls, we know that Ukraine lies between #Tibet and #Bhutan. Our #Germany, in contrast, is here, close, safe, and warm.
3. We want to keep it that way. Ukraine will have no choice but to stay behind the Himalayas while we will continue living in our old home, the #EU-#NATO continent. Such is life... Sure, we have lots of interest, empathy, and respect for #Ukrainians.
1. The #Ukrainians' short-term expectations of a defeat of Russia may be overly optimistic. Yet, the mid-term implications of the fundamental changes in the international images of #Russia and #Ukraine during the last two weeks may indeed lead to some sort of Ukrainian victory.
2. Russia's foreign ambitions were already before 2022 overstretched & disproportionate to the capacity of the Russian economy. Now the ambitions have become even more extravagant while the Russian economy is seemingly entering not a recession but a more or less deep depression.
3. On top of the currently imposed & forthcoming sanctions, there will be mounting further problems for Russia's economy resulting from (a) the gradual disengagement of risk-averse as well as ethically woke trade, research and investment partners, not least of the EU, and from...
2. Die riesigen #Energierlieferungen sind durch eine riesige, immobile und schwer ersetzbare Exportinfrastruktur möglich. Daher ist dieser apodiktische Satz eine Spekulation: #Putin|s "Entschluss steht fest und ist aus meiner Sicht durch keine #Sanktion der Welt zu beeinflussen."