Pro-#Russia voices started by outright denying it, but by the end of the day, guided by strategic disinformation from the #Kremlin, they were blaming it on #Ukraine.
2. Initially, proponents of the invasion said it was all a lie, citing a clip of the mayor of #Bucha purportedly celebrating the liberation of the town days earlier but not mentioning any massacres.
3. Then, the preferred framing shifted to one that blamed the deaths on #Ukraine artillery fire.
The "supporting evidence" for this claim was a clip of a purported #UKR soldier talking about indiscriminate mortar fire against #RUS positions in the southeast a few weeks ago.
4. When it became clear that people had been executed, not “just” killed by artillery, the framing morphed again—now it was all about staging.
This was pinned to a single clip in which Russian activists claimed corpses could be seen “moving” and were the "wrong colour.”
5. Eventually, it became impossible to keep the "staging" narrative up as more images and clips streamed out.
At that point, the #Kremlin's preferred framing shifted to the idea that #Bucha was a "false flag" and, accordingly, a "#Ukrainian war crime."
6. There are two variants of this narrative building off just three bits of "evidence":
- First, that #UKR forces were overzealous and indiscriminate when pushing the #Russia|ns out.
- Second, that they were genocidally "cleansing" #Bucha of supporters of the Russian war.
7. This is just one vivid example of how the #Kremlin and its supporters are now navigating through the #Ukraine information space.
The subject matter varies, but it’s this same formula of selective framing and audacious disinfo that we’re seeing repeat time and again.
8. Interestingly, pro-#Kremlin feeds are remarkably devoid of any images from #Bucha that are being circulated by parties other than #Russia|n state media.
#Moscow's supporters appear to be completely siloed, cut off from anything other than their own misinformation.
9. For more information on the work we’re doing at @Ex_Trac, visit extrac.io and sign up.
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1. In recent months, we’ve been tracking chatter about the World Cup in #Qatar across #IS, #AQ, and Shi'a militant group (#SMG) networks online.
2. Interest has been fairly limited in #AQ & #SMG ecosystems but #IS|ers have been calling for attacks, with momentum for these calls spiking in recent days.
Graphs show incidence of posts with “Qatar” (yellow), “World Cup” (blue), and “football” (red).
3. One #IS call-to-arms singles out teams / supporters of Coalition member states, above all #US and #France.
There have also been multiple assertions that attacks needn’t happen only in #Qatar, the logic being that an attack anywhere during the WC will be maximally disruptive.
1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.
Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.
There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
3. In videos shared across pro-#Kremlin Telegram that had reportedly been shot immediately after the first 'strike,' smoke can be seen billowing before a large explosion at the site.
1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.
On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.
In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.