4. Notably, while #IS has reported the largest number of attacks from #Iraq, it has claimed *four times* more “confirmed” kills from #Nigeria than anywhere else.
5. As part of the campaign, #IS has been attacking outside its normal sphere of influence.
In #Nigeria, for example, it has deployed two operations in #Taraba and one in #Kogi, 500 km and 1,000 km respectively from its heartlands in #Borno.
6. All that said, the silence from #IS's affiliates in #Mozambique and the #Sahel has persisted, and there have so far been no truly major strategic operations in #Iraq or #Syria.
On that basis, so far at least, this campaign is all about image.
Pro-#Russia voices started by outright denying it, but by the end of the day, guided by strategic disinformation from the #Kremlin, they were blaming it on #Ukraine.
2. Initially, proponents of the invasion said it was all a lie, citing a clip of the mayor of #Bucha purportedly celebrating the liberation of the town days earlier but not mentioning any massacres.
3. Then, the preferred framing shifted to one that blamed the deaths on #Ukraine artillery fire.
The "supporting evidence" for this claim was a clip of a purported #UKR soldier talking about indiscriminate mortar fire against #RUS positions in the southeast a few weeks ago.
1. This week’s issue of al-Naba’, which was published last night, took #IS's campaign to legitimise its new leader in a new, quite surprising direction.
Directly comparing the legacy of #IS's 'caliphs' with that of the Rashidun caliphs, it pushed back on criticism—seemingly from within #IS's own circles—of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and played down the strategic significance of his loss.
3. #IS also pushed back on criticism about how long it had taken it to confirm that Abu Ibrahim had been killed and replaced by Abul Hasan.
Per al-Naba’, everyone who needed to had pledged allegiance within less than 48 hours of the #Atmeh raid.
1. Earlier this month, we reported that #IS comms activity had fallen off a cliff in recent weeks.
In the last few days, the reason for that has become clear: its media team was putting everything into prepping for a global campaign drumming up support for the new caliph.
2. The campaign started on 10 March, when #IS published a statement from new spox Abu ‘Umar al-Muhajir declaring that Qurashi had died and been replaced by Qurashi 2.0.
This came after a week-on-week drop in comms that left #IS supporter activities at a historic low.
3. It wasn’t enough to just publish a statement. #IS needed to show that its new leader was credible.
Accordingly, in the days that followed, it published hundreds of photographs showing fighters from West Africa to Southeast Asia pledging allegiance to the new caliph.
1. Recent pronouncements from #Moscow about its ‘concerns’ around the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (#CBRN) weapons systems in #Ukraine are having a direct and sustained impact on the pro-#Russia information landscape.
2. @Ex_Trac data shows that #Moscow’s comms re #CBRN have been normalising it as ‘reasonable’ justification for war among pro-#Kremlin communities.
To track this, we visualised the frequency with which #CBRN-related terms have been referenced by pro-#Kremlin voices over 2021/22.
3. The regularity of posts including the word ‘биолаборатория’ (‘biolaboratory’) increased by a factor of more than four hundred after the #Kremlin’s claim it was targeting bioweapons facilities at the end of February.
1. #IS has started reporting attacks from #CaboDelgado again.
This follows a three-month pause in its comms from #Mozambique.
Specifically, in the last three days alone, it’s claimed 16 operations.
2. After the recapture of Mocimboa da Praia three months ago by #Mozambique, #Rwanda & #SouthAfrica (among others), #IS’s comms went dark.
However, its network there was far from inactive, as these latest data, combined with what @ACLEDINFO has been reporting, indicate.
3. From a geographic perspective, #IS’s self-reported activities in recent months have been confined to the Mocimboa da Praia district of #CaboDelgado.
No attacks were reported from Palma, even though @ACLEDINFO data (displayed in yellow) suggests otherwise.