Yday, #Lavrov’s confirmation in #Cairo that #Russia seeks to “help the Ukrainian people to free themselves” from their regime gained - understandably -considerable attention in Western capitals.
But it might obscure other important aspects of #Lavrov’s visit to #Egypt. A 🧵1/14
But #Lavrov's engaged the Arabs extensively since Feb, visiting Algeria, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi. He also hosted other Arab FMs in Moscow
Now Egypt, where he also engaged the League of Arab States 2/14
This effort to engage evenly – Iran, Turkey, Israel, Arabs – is a long-standing feature of #Russia’s MENA policy, but will become more important in light of Western #sanctions.
Losing further friends would be costly, even in a region that’s of 2ndary importance to #Russia. 3/14
#Egypt is a huge Arab country, recipient of significant #US aid, but has cooperated more w/ #Russia under Sisi.
When I testified to Congress in May, there was great interest in how #US can end Egypt’s “balancing act”.
But doing this ain't easy: #Egypt needs #Russia in the areas of 1. #grain (high dependence); 2. weapons (an interest in systems like Su-35s is rooted in an Egyptian dissatisfaction over what the #US doesn’t sell Cairo given a concern with Israel’s QME in the region),... 5/14
...3. tourism (when RUS tourists stopped going to #Egypt in late 2015, after a passenger plane was downed over the Sinai, it really hurt the Egyptian economy). 6/14
Last month, #Egypt’s Min. of Trade & Industry announced that Cairo will adopt a payment mechanism to allow use of Russian ruble in trade exchange with #Moscow.
Egypt was also a primary guest country at this year’s St Petersburg Int. Economic Forum al-monitor.com/originals/2022… 7/14
And then there’s El Dabaa, the 1st nuclear power plant #Rosatom will build in #Egypt.
While there were rumours in the spring that the project might be put on hold, the first concrete was reportedly poured at El Dabaa last week: neimagazine.com/news/newsfirst… 8/14
Will #Russia remain an attractive source of weapons/ NPPs to Egypt (& MENA) medium-term?
On the supply side #sanctions may impede its ability to offer 1) attractive financing & 2) repair/maintenance. On the demand side recipients might doubt performance of certain systems
9/14
I don’t think the jury's out on these questions - so watch that space.
By the way, #Russian messaging in #Egypt on #RussiaUkraineWar has been consistent and aggressive, also appealing to anti-colonial sentiments in the country.
This kind of stuff on (social) media resonates and matters.
Remember, at a recent #BRICS meeting in June, Putin hammered home that the West was responsible for the global food crisis. 12/14
Bottom line: #Russia will continue its efforts at preserving/expanding influence w/countries like Egypt
And Egypt will be receptive to such efforts
This is not to overstate the potential for cooperation: not all MoUs & plans for cooperation materialize (see Russia-Iran)! 13/14
But #Russian successes at engaging across the Global South will matter -- INCREMENTALLY and CUMULATIVELY -- for the #West’s confrontation with #Russia over the medium- to long-term.
Pushing back against Russia thus 1) takes extra effort & 2) is of strategic importance beyond #Ukraine (1/11)
For proof that #Russia is not isolated, look toward big parts of Asia, LatAm, Africa, Middle East. Voting patterns at #UNGA. Who hasn’t joint sanctions against #Russia. How media beyond the "West" reports on the war in #Ukraine. And most of all: Look at #China and #India. (2/11)
Let’s take #MiddleEast: Sure, there’s few staunch supporters of #Russia (Syria). Most "sit on the fence": Reluctant to join sanctions; Saudis/UAE won't pump more oil; Even #NATO ally (!) #Turkey & closest US ally #Israel tread cautiously due to security concerns vis Russia (3/11)
The #USA/#NATO have few good options for deterring #Russia’s use of #ChemicalWeapons (CW) in #Ukraine - or punishing such use after the fact, since “the toolkit of punishments includes the very deterrents that failed to change Moscow’s calculus in the first place.” /2
I examine the lessons from multiple failures to deter #ChemicalWeapons use in #Syria, concluding: “It is hard to prevent a highly motivated actor from chemical use, especially if the deterring side fails to respond decisively to the first crossing of the “red line.” /3
Russia’s tactics @OPCW & UNSC over CW use in #Syria & the Navalny poisoning offer good indications.
Bottom line: Attribution/accountability will be a very hard lift
Thread /1
A few weeks ago, US/#NATO officials raised alarm over possible Russian CW use in #Ukraine (framed by #Russia as false-flag op conducted by UA “radicals”), warning this would be “game changer” & would elicit an “aggressive response”. Yet, no clear red line was communicated. /2
Meanwhile, a #NATO official suggested that, were there to be a CW attack delivered by mil. means, attribution to #Russia would be “immediate”. The key Q, so said official, was thus: "Is #Russia going to want to stay below the threshold of attribution?” /3
Speaking w/some contacts in #Russia to try to understand evolving sentiments in society re: #RussiaUkraineWar, 3 factors stand out for me:
1. Adaptive behaviour 2. "Besieged fortress" 3. State propaganda working wonders
A thread. /1
1. Adaptive behaviour: Many Russians say "what is expected of them" - they support the #Kremlin on #Ukraine. They might (or not!) hold different views privately, but perceived social pressures + fear of reprisal drive adaptive behaviour - so you can best cope in everyday life /2
2. Besieged fortress: Adaptive behaviour is amplified by a sense among many Russians that their isolation& life under sanctions will be for a long time. Plus, whether you wanted the war or not, Russia is now "mobilized" against immense outside pressures. Result: consolidation. /3
Having worked in Moscow when #Russia intervened in #Syria in 2015 & engaged RUS officials/experts on #Syria for yrs, I see 5 parallels in approach to #Ukraine vs #Syria
1. Sequential war: RUS recently termed 1st phase of #UkraineWar done, announcing focus on Donbas. In #Syria war, Russia had declared new phase in 2017, establishing de-escalation zones (DEZs) in Western parts, which freed up regime resources to take more territory toward the East
Once that was done, regime/Russia turned back & we saw sequential take-over of DEZs (E Ghouta, Homs, Deraa) in 2018 under guise of CT. Not at all to say that sequencing in Ukraine will be the same. Return of larger-scale fighting toward W Ukraine will depend on...
#Russia and #UA, after 3 meetings - Feb 28, March 3 and 7 - in Belarus keep "constantly" talking online now; in video talks, working groups have been created. Zelenskiy on the talks: the sides are talking, "and not just throwing around ultimatums";
Podolyak: There's a dozen proposals on the table, on the political & military settlement: ceasefire (& formula for it), withdrawal of RUS troops...now all is addressed in working groups...once "mutual reciprocal legal formats" are worked out, there will be 4th (physical) meeting;