Thread by @SethAbramson

(THREAD) Here's a brief itemization of the factual errors in the New York Times' breaking news story, below, about Michael Flynn possibly having signed a cooperation deal with Bob Mueller. The errors are inexplicable, and it's important they be called out. nytimes.com/2017/11/23/us/…

1/ It was on March 31, 2017—not today—Flynn began negotiating a cooperation deal. The negotiation began with an "offer" from Flynn's attorneys to Congress and Mueller—and that offer was not "rejected" by Congress so much as identified as premature. But the negotiation began then.

2/ This matters—as those who follow the probe have known since March Flynn signing a deal was a matter of time, leverage and hammering out details. Mueller needed time to get maximum leverage before hammering out details—the only way he'd refuse is if Flynn were a primary target.

3/ The NYT has toyed—or even more than that—with Trump's self-aggrandizing pet theory that he isn't a target, so they assumed Flynn flipping at some point *wasn't* certain. But experts saw that, while Flynn was going to face punishment here, Donald Trump was the primary target.

4/ The NYT then, in the second paragraph here, completely misstates the scope and purpose of the Mueller probe as it was authorized by the DOJ. Readers reading this paragraph would be completely misinformed about what Mueller has been tasked to do here. And it matters to America.

5/ This is what Mueller is *actually* authorized to investigate: not whether Trump's campaign aided efforts to undermine Clinton, but a) ANY links between Russia and Trump's campaign, b) ANY new matters that arise from that investigation, and c) ANY attempts to hinder the probe.

6/ Given that the scope of Mueller's authority is a national issue—as before this is all over, Trump will seek to fire Mueller—the New York Times adopting the Trump campaign line on Mueller's authority ("we're only in trouble if we actively helped Russian hacking") is a problem.

7/ It's true defense lawyers with different clients can't work together when it poses a conflict—and that conflict arises the moment two suspects have divergent legal interests, *not* when one is cooperating. So in fact cooperation of the sort Trump and Flynn had is *not* common.

8/ Legal experts saw legal exposure for Trump and Flynn in February of 2017—and saw both men as witnesses and possible suspects in the same federal criminal investigation. Sharing privileged info or valuable investigative research under such circumstances is suspect and uncommon.

9/ Trump's legal exposure comes in part from an April call to Flynn in which he told him to "stay strong"—after which Flynn refused to hand over docs to Congress. So Trump-Flynn coordination to date has been a scandal and maybe evidence of criminal witness tampering—not "common."

10/ Keeping in mind I've been saying since March 31 that Flynn will eventually get a deal—because Trump is Mueller's target—the idea an info-sharing deal ends only if Flynn has cut a deal or Flynn has initiated plea negotiations is farcical. There are many other possible reasons.

11/ As I've indicated, the info-sharing deal between Flynn and Trump was (a) ethically dubious from the start, (b) possibly connected to a course of conduct by Trump and allies that constituted witness tampering, and (c) nonsensical from a strategic standpoint—at least for Flynn.

12/ So the end of their deal could have been provoked by a sense that already divergent legal interests had further diverged; that the deal favored Trump more than Flynn (as it did from the get-go); or that it was always ethically dubious—which fact has finally been acknowledged.

13/ The claim by the NYT that negotiations have "[just] begun" between Flynn and probe agents is laughable—as, again, the outreach from Flynn's attorney in March was intended to be to Mueller via Congress, not just to Congress. The NYT is erasing a critical prior news item here.

14/ This is happening more and more in major media: because reporters haven't read, don't recall, or never understood their peers' prior reporting, they simply re-narrativize events in a way that erases the prior reporting and makes their own work sound like a breaking news item.

15/ The New York Times also erases Flynn's evolving view on Russia—even though understanding that evolution is critical to the Trump-Russia timeline. Reading this story, you'd think that Flynn has always "advocated closer ties to Russia." That's not so. And it matters here—a lot.

16/ Federal criminal investigators who are trying to determine precisely *when* Michael Flynn was compromised by Russia would naturally be interested by a 2014 CNN story that included this paragraph:

17/ So in March 2014, Flynn saw Russia as an adversary aggressively trying to steal our secrets. By the time the first 2016 primary votes are counted, Flynn is advocating friendly U.S.-Russia relations. Did Trump turn him? Did Putin? Timing matters—and the NYT again erases facts.

18/ This here? This is just embarrassing. First, Flynn went to Russia to dine with Putin in December 2015—*six months* after the Trump campaign began, and *four months* after Flynn first began advising Trump. This is a *critical* fact in the probe—and the NYT completely blows it.

19/ By implying Flynn met with Putin *before* Trump announced his run and *before* he was advising Trump, the NYT exonerates Trump for any relationship that might be seen between his ongoing effort to contact Putin via backchannel and Flynn's December '15 trip to dine with Putin.

20/ Secondly, no, Flynn was *not* the point person for the transition on Russia. How do we know? Because Trump *didn't appoint Flynn to the transition team*. And it *matters*. It was a Kushner-led coup that *deposed* Christie and opened a path for Flynn to join the transition.

21/ The fact that Jared Kushner sought—in an act of open warfare—to get Trump's good pal Chris Christie *fired* from the transition to install Flynn atop the team is *incredibly damning for Kushner*.

The fact Trump hid Flynn as a shadow advisor from the start is *also* damning.

22/ This misinformation is 100% Trump party line: the idea that Manafort, who ran the campaign for six months—from the moment Trump was clearly going to win the nomination until a matter of weeks before the election—was peripheral. In fact he was *much* more important than Flynn.

23/ Flynn was *critical* to Trump—no doubt about it. But Manafort's *day-to-day influence on the campaign*—from mid-March, when he began his involvement; to late March, when he received a key role; to weeks later, when he became Campaign Manager; to his summer firing—was *huge*.

24/ The NYT also erases the fact that, *after* his firing, Manafort simply went from being an unpaid Campaign Manager to an unpaid advisor—reports indicate Manafort was advising Trump as late as February 2017. It matters—Manafort steered policy, the platform, strategy, messaging.

25/ And of course Manafort lived in the same building as Trump for years before he began advising the campaign in March '16—so his possible connection to Trump is years longer than Flynn's (which we know began in August '15). And Flynn didn't have the reach or juice Manafort did.

26/ This is another journalistic error all journalists are prone to—all humans—and I'm no different. These NYT writers are trying to pump up their scoop by implying the previous news on Manafort was less important than this *new* news on Flynn. But it's not new—or more important.

27/ This is the sort of journalistic filler you get when you contact an attorney and ask him whether a prospective new defendant in his client's case could offer incriminating evidence against his client. No defense lawyer in America—not now, not since 1776—will say yes to that.

28/ Why give the White House that quote? Sure, reach out for a quote, but as a professor who teaches journalism I tell students to use quotes only when they *advance a story*—not because a given figure "deserves to be heard" on a given story. No interviewee blindly deserves that.

29/ No! This is *wrong*. Trump formed a national security team in March 2016—and didn't name Flynn to it. Then he disbanded that team in July—and didn't name Flynn to the new team. Then he created a transition team on national security—and didn't name Flynn to it. And it matters.

30/ When Trump is eventually tried—which he will be, whether via impeachment, indictment, or both—a key piece of evidence will be that he relied heavily on Flynn for national security advice but tried to keep his campaign profile low because he knew what Flynn was secretly doing.

31/ Indeed, this was Trump's M.O.: he put forward a largely fake team of advisors for public consumption, while in reality taking domestic policy advice—look it up—from Sean Hannity and national security advice from Michael Flynn and Erik Prince. They were hidden for a *reason*.

32/ So the New York Times blithely implying that Trump proudly displayed Flynn's influence on his thinking from Day One—the sort of revisionist history that might be written by someone who only knows Flynn was eventually made NSA—is deeply damaging to the truth and its reporting.

33/ And no, Flynn was *not* "forced out over his conversations with the Russian ambassador"—and that's kind of the *point*! Had Trump fired Flynn for secretly negotiating with the Russians, everything would have been different. But Trump *explicitly refused to fire him for that*.

34/ Key evidence against Trump in the Russia probe is that he *praised* Flynn for secretly negotiating with Kislyak pre-inauguration—and said he would've *told* him to do it. Then he refused to fire him. Then he only fired him for lying to Pence. Then he threatened to rehire him.

35/ In what universe was the "idea that the incoming administration was trying to undermine the departing president and curry favor with Moscow" first "invited" by the Flynn/Kislyak call? That idea was glaringly obvious from the time of Trump's Mayflower Speech on April 27, 2016.

36/ And it matters. It matters that the Flynn/Kislyak call was *confirmation*—not initiation—of legitimate, grounded concerns that Trump had sought to "curry favor with Moscow" and undermine U.S. sanctions policy from the moment Manafort became Campaign Manager. It's a key fact.

37/ This is the most complex federal criminal investigation of our lifetimes—and the biggest political news story of our lifetimes. It'll eventually be considered the biggest political crime of our lifetimes. But many of the top reporters on this story don't really understand it.

38/ Occasional slip-ups happen—hey, I earlier in this thread said Flynn was trying to negotiate with "Mueller via Congress" when (non-anachronistically) I meant "Comey via Congress"—but the NYT errors are systemic, pro-Trump, deeply misleading, and reveal *key* misunderstandings.

39/ The NYT *must* correct its error regarding the timing of the 2015 RT gala (as compared to when Trump's campaign started and when Flynn began advising him). But it also must do *much* better at having its reporters understand the full scope, sweep and complexity of this story.

40/ If you compare how this case has been handled and covered—by law enforcement and media—versus how a *typical* criminal case is handled and covered, you see that both investigation and coverage are *unbelievably pro-defendant*—pro-Trump.

It's an anomaly—and it matters. {end}