1. There’s been a lot of short-sighted and ill-informed commentary on India’s neighbourhood policy of late by Indian commentators. This happens periodically. There was another wave two years ago.
2. For context, keep in mind a few realities. One, all of India’s neighbours are democratising, not just electorally. Public spaces have opened, with opposition leaders, bloggers, etc. In the long-run this is a positive. In the near term there are growing pains.
3. Two, nationalism (which has always been present) has found new voice. It is natural that nationalism should sometimes manifest itself as anti-Indianism, given overlapping ethnicities and India’s relative size.
4. So the helicopter reporting that you often see, of an Indian journalist talking to the man or woman on the street in Kathmandu or Thimphu about how much they hate India, should be seen in this context. That’s never the full picture. Not by a long shot.
5. Three, these countries have agency. They make choices too, and Indian commentators often seem to disregard this. Not everything that goes badly in India’s neighbourhood is India’s fault, just as India does not deserve credit for everything that goes well.
6. So these countries do make, and will make, electoral choices. Sometimes they will be in alignment with India’s preferences, but often they will not. To somehow fault India for Rajapaksa’s victory in SL’s local elections is bizarre.
7. Four, China’s regional influence is unquestionably rising. In Nepal, it’s primarily political. In Bangladesh, there are old defence ties. In Sri Lanka and Maldives it is more economic. Still, most Indian commentary wildly exaggerates China’s footprint.
8. Consider Nepal. India has an open border, over 1m Nepali workers, 7 regiments of Nepalis in the Indian Army, 127,000 Nepalis receiving Indian pensions. India accounts for over 60% of Nepali exports and imports; China accounts for 14% of imports and less than 2% of exports.
9. With Bhutan, India heavily supports the Royal Bhutan Army and the level of security cooperation and integration is not always appreciated. Bhutan receives over $500 million in Indian aid each year. India accounts for 84% of Bhutan’s trade. China less than 1%.
10. In Sri Lanka, where China’s economic influence has been most pronounced, India’s two-way trade is about 15%: just a shade higher than China’s total share. Only in Bangladesh is China’s trade (because of Chinese imports) significantly higher than India’s.
11. About 45% of India’s lines of credit ($11 out of $24 billion) extended since 2003 have been to just four countries: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives. Bangladesh has been the largest recipient (almost $8 bn).
12. India’s been a first responder to most major humanitarian crises, from refugees in Bangladesh to cyclones in Sri Lanka. Who remembers operation Neer to bring water to the Maldives? Earthquake assistance to Nepal?
13. Are there problems? Absolutely. Could India do more to deliver and be a better partner. Sure. But by ignoring coverage of these countries unless there's a political crisis, one gets a really distorted picture. END.
