The Protocol is intended as ‘insurance’ in case a future UK-EU agreement is insufficient to meet the commitments made in the Joint Report bit.ly/2Bgjvj6. In that sense it is *already* conditional & envisaged as temporary.
It is a backstop, not a precursor.
2/11
It is a backstop, not a precursor.
2/11
The Protocol is the EU showing most flexibility (cherrypicking) *for* Northern Ireland in the very areas that the UK is finding hard to swallow, i.e. NI being in a Common Regulatory Area and the Customs Territory of the EU.
3/11
3/11
The UK govt has a choice here:
(A) accept Protocol but make sure UK-EU Agmt is so comprehensive as to ensure it never comes into play;
(B) meet EU's flexibility with flexibility of its own; or
(C) attempt to make Protocol redundant at this point.
4/11
(A) accept Protocol but make sure UK-EU Agmt is so comprehensive as to ensure it never comes into play;
(B) meet EU's flexibility with flexibility of its own; or
(C) attempt to make Protocol redundant at this point.
4/11
On (A): the draft text was but a starting position for negotiation.
Of course the prospect of customs & new regulatory controls between GB & NI is unpalatable. The expectation was that the UK would propose an alternative, i.e. (B).
5/11
Of course the prospect of customs & new regulatory controls between GB & NI is unpalatable. The expectation was that the UK would propose an alternative, i.e. (B).
5/11
On (B): what flexibility could the UK show?
Recent if slightly-confused references to Lichtenstein and to special economic zones are hinting at what could work here.
@MESandbu was onto something on.ft.com/2wNfqNi.
UK could allow NI to have a privileged position.
6/11
Recent if slightly-confused references to Lichtenstein and to special economic zones are hinting at what could work here.
@MESandbu was onto something on.ft.com/2wNfqNi.
UK could allow NI to have a privileged position.
6/11
On (C ): Protocol is not just about trade; it recognises distinct needs of NI. Insistence on an all-UK, undifferentiated arrangement has created a situation in which NI/IRL issue is the greatest threat to the Withdrawal Agreement, which is both unnecessary & self-defeating.
7/11
7/11
UK govt’s refusal to consider specific arrangements for NI is due to a category error [the ‘constitutional integrity’ of the UK does not come into it – NI’s status cannot change without a referendum]
& a blind spot [refusal to recognise unique position of NI, ie 1998 Agmt].
8/11
& a blind spot [refusal to recognise unique position of NI, ie 1998 Agmt].
8/11
On what grounds will UK govt not show flexibility to NI?
All parties in NI point to distinct position of NI re: Brexit. bit.ly/2y0y2yr
The DUP has called for the particular circumstances of NI to be recognised + for NI to be a ‘hub’ for trade btn the UK & Ireland.
9/11
All parties in NI point to distinct position of NI re: Brexit. bit.ly/2y0y2yr
The DUP has called for the particular circumstances of NI to be recognised + for NI to be a ‘hub’ for trade btn the UK & Ireland.
9/11
A soft Brexit is not anathema to the DUP – in fact it is the conclusion to be drawn from its stated positions.
What is anathema to the DUP is the breakup of the UK. The best insurance against this is not a hard Brexit but properly functioning, heavy-duty devolution.
10/11
What is anathema to the DUP is the breakup of the UK. The best insurance against this is not a hard Brexit but properly functioning, heavy-duty devolution.
10/11
This is why the 1998 Agreement is not merely a NI concern.
What it did was institutionalise the unionist/nationalist, north/south & British/Irish cooperation necessary for peace.
Which takes us back to the need for something specific for NI…
See: bit.ly/1gNT9yz
11/11
What it did was institutionalise the unionist/nationalist, north/south & British/Irish cooperation necessary for peace.
Which takes us back to the need for something specific for NI…
See: bit.ly/1gNT9yz
11/11
