Thread by @Usherwood

How about we start this lovely morning with a trip down memory lane?

1/

You'll recall the Maastricht treaty: bane of eurosceptics, source of so many woes, embodiment of federal visions? Whatever

Today I'm more interested in its signing

2/

If you think back to then (those of you old enough to remember the early 1990s), you probably think about this: the late-night debates and arguments in 9-10 Dec at the #EUCO
3/

This was the moment of Major's "game, set and match" comment, as he secured opt-outs on the single currency, JHA and the social provisions (resulting in the Social Charter)

4/

"so what" you say, "that was different from anything May might do"

And you'd be right.

However, that's not the point

5/

As any good textbook will tell you [cough], the Maastricht Treaty wasn't signed at that meeting, but on 7 Feb the following year

6/

The reason? Precisely that the #EUCO had made a bunch of decisions that needed to be turned into legal text

7/

That included Major's concessions, but also other stuff that bubbled up. @AndrewDuffEU wrote soon after on this

8/

All of this meant that despite principals' agreement on a deal, that was not the same as a legal text that could be signed and then sent for ratification

9/

So your image of signature should really be that of Hurd and Maude in a room decorated with curtain material, not a bullish Major

10/

The point, I hope, is clear: holding out for a last minute in Art.50 is problematic for many reasons, but a simple one is that - given the hard deadline (which Maastricht didn't have) - you can't turn words into legal text instantaneously

11/

and here endth the trip

/end

@AndrewDuffEU I can't find a copy of the Belmont European Policy Centre book noted in footnote 2 anywhere: would be v.interested to read about the other issues involved here. Do you have a copy?