The Brexit White Paper turns cherry-picking into a form of international relations art. I cannot see how the EU could accept it as a basis for proper negotiations. 1/
The UK claims to be leaving the customs union but wants to keep the free circulation which only a proper customs union guarantees. EU should be worried about divergent UK tariffs, particularly for parts & components. 2/
Tariff-free trade would extend to fish but the UK can decide on EU fishermen access to its markets. 3/
Reports suggested that the UK would stay in the internal market for goods and leave the market for services. But the specifics of the White Paper tell a completely different story. 4/
The common rulebook for goods is limited to regulations applied at the border. Clearest in the section on agrifood: labelling rules not included. 6/
Pick and choose in services. Mutual recognition of professional qualifications maintained, and transport not categorised as services; but UK clearly seeks to stay in the internal air transport market. 6/
Financial services looks like abandoning passporting, but the insistence on much more robust and binding equivalence is cakeism. Coupled with no commitment to EU rulebook - rather dialogue and scrutiny between equals. 7/
Free movement/migration looked at through the lens of trade in services. No willingness even to negotiate free movement of workers. 8/
Other parts also complete cherrypicking. We love the Europen Arrest Warrant and enforceability of our judgment but don’t need a common framework for economic and other sanctions. 8/
Enforceability supervision and dispute settlement are precarious. State aid for example: UK will just monitor itself, but there no examples, anywhere in the world, of this working. Notable that the EEA has the EFTA Surveillance Authority to ensure compliance. 9/
No mention of direct effect, even of common rulebooks. Suggests that there will be very few disputes, but the EU’s internal experience shows this to be wrong. Some recognition role ECJ but query whether enough to safeguard autonomy EU law. 10/
Overall architecture consists of separable agreements, leading the EU down the Swiss route, which for the EU clearly has not worked. 11/
If the EU did what the UK does in this paper, there could never be an agreement. They would ask for free movement, would limit financial services and transport, would ask for common sanctions, would limit enforceability of UK judgments, etc etc. 12/
The pure focus on perceived economic interests and lack of conceptual thinking would, if replicated by the EU, lead to an extraordinarily complex negotiation with little chance of success. 13/
Having read this (admittedly quickly and for the first time) I can’t see why Davis and Johnston resigned. Would be a pretty good deal for the UK, and is much harder than I thought. 14/
I can see the political difficulty of an outright rejection, yet cannot see how the EU could ever accept anything which looks remotely like this. The integrity of its ecosystem really is at stake. 15/
