An addition to my thread discussing @lawyers4britain’s unhappiness with the Chequers proposals for dispute resolution in the U.K./EU agreement (the “Moldova model”).
I argued in that thread that the Moldova model is one way of dealing with the dispute resolution issues that arise where a third country promises to adopt EU law, given that the EU Treaties (according to the ECJ) require the ECJ to be the final determiner of EU rules.
But I also pointed out that hooking up to the EFTA Court (an option ignored by @lawyers4britain) would be a much more satisfactory approach, meeting their understandable objection to having the interpretation of rules binding the U.K. settled by a court with no U.K. judge.
I’ve since read this article by my colleague Carl Baudenbacher, former President of the EFTA Court. prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/forme…
He makes the point that it isn’t clear that the Moldova option actually works, since the ECJ has never approved it.
He also makes the point that it’s a weak enforcement mechanism, since it deprives U.K. businesses of the ability to access the ECJ when seeking to enforce the EU/UK agreement in the EU: and, remember, effective enforcement is always in the interests of the smaller party.
Finally, he points out that 🇨🇭 is also in search of a dispute resolution mechanism for its agreements with the EU. There’s a common problem. Hooking up to the EFTA Court would solve that common problem, as well as improving on the uncertainty and weakness of the Moldova model.
