1/n (Thread: TLDR of George Borjas' 'We Wanted Workers') At the outset, I'll note that the book in question is actually a fairly quick read. Thus, this tldr thread is primarily intended for those who still have 'too much going on' to pick up a copy. But, to be honest, I suspect..
2/n...that some of you are already somewhat familiar with the many of the points Borjas' raises in his thesis: i.e. contrary to the impression conveyed by some economists and their liberal parrots, [particularly low-skilled] Immigration is NOT a 'win-win' for everyone...
3/n The plausible 'best case' scenario is that sustained low-skilled immigration has no net effect on the economics of the native population. But even in this case, there are still winners and losers: high-skilled natives benefit from cheap labor, while low-skilled natives...
4/n ...see their wages decline by 3% for each 10% increase in the size of the low-skilled foreign-born population. Borgas characterizes this outcome as a 'redistribution of wealth' that flows from the bottom to the top of the socio-economic hierarchy.
5/n But it also flows outward: from low-skilled natives to their low-skilled counterparts in the developing world.
6/n Another point he makes is that people often conceive of low-skilled immigrants as if they are robots (insofar as they're 'only' bringing cheap labor). This is wrong: such immigrants bring their cheap labor AND the HUMAN baggage that comes with...
7/n ...being socialized in a drastically different cultural environment and having minimal education. In other words: low-skilled immigrants are not hardware. They have wants, needs and preferences that carry consequences for both their assimilation into and their impact on...
8/n ...the local population. On this point, he argues that while high-skilled/educated immigrants can be expected to benefit the welfare state (i.e. because they're likely to pay in more than they consume), low-skill immigrants drag it down.
9/n As such, those who equate the recent (post-1960s) waves of immigration to those of the first half of the 20th century are being dishonest. They are vastly different the data appears to bear this out 
10/n The early waves of immigration faced greater assimilative pressures. They often had little choice but to learn english. In contrast, and in addition to having lower education, low-skilled immigrants also increasingly settle in 'ethnic enclaves' where...
11/n ...assimilative pressures are lower (because why learn English if everyone speaks Spanish?)
12/n And such also affects the outcomes of the 2nd-generation (i.e. their kids) whose wages still lag behind second-generation immigrants from developed countries
13/n Unlike robots, low-skilled laborers ultimately 'break down' and, consequently, will be in need of government assistance (i.e. welfare).
14/n Studies showing that immigrants do not consume more welfare than natives misleadingly exclude their us-born children in their analyses (see curtain #2 below). If we include the latter, we find that the gap between immigrant and native consumption is widening
15/n But even excluding the children, immigrants, at best, don't consume significantly *less* welfare than natives.
16/n In the short run, the effects of immigration (on wages) are largely negative across the board. In the long run, the best we can say is that it produces winners and losers (the latter being low-skilled natives)
17/n Of course, this assessment neglects to account for the impact on the welfare state. Some argue that more immigrants = more taxpayers = good for welfare state. But this argument only holds if immigrants are paying in more than they're taking out.
18/n Borjas thus argues that, if the object is enlarging the pool of 'payers', a country's immigration policy should encourage high-skilled while restricting low-skilled immigration (as the latter are unlikely to make much of a contribution)
19/n Alternatively, if we opt for the continuance of 'mixed-skilled' immigration, Borgas' recommends that we build a 'wall' around the welfare state (i.e. make it harder for low-skilled immigrants to benefit from it)
20/n One of the takeaways I got from reading this book is that the open-borders camp has to come to terms with the fact that low-skilled diversity + bigger government is NOT sustainable...
21/n Thus, rather than sugarcoating the data, appealing to emotion ('we're a nation of immigrants!' 'give us your tired, your poor' blah blah etc.) and/or branding opponents as 'racially resentful' bigots, it's time we actually have an honest conversation about the specifics.
22/n As Borgas suggests, It's also time we be honest about our motives, which, in the case of many in the open-immigration crowd, is more about a sense of moral duty (to those in the undeveloped world) than it is the (dubious) economic payoffs.
23/n And If one has this moral inclination, that's fine--but at least then acknowledge that you're effectively prioritizing disadvantaged foreigners to the same or an even greater degree than their native counterparts (a disproportionate number of which are African American)
24/n And if you acknowledge that, don't be surprised when 'America First' candidates are elected. (End of Thread)
I forgot to dedicate this thread to you @ronanfitz22 😉
