Documents we have analyzed from Iran's nuclear archive indicate that rather than halting its nuclear weaponization work in 2003, Iran was carrying out an elaborate effort to break the AMAD program into covert and overt parts. 1)
The overt parts would be centered at research institutes and universities, and any effort that could not be plausibly denied as civilian in nature was left as a covert activity. 2)
Iran's weaponization program carried on in a more research-oriented fashion after 2003, aimed at eliminating scientific and engineering bottlenecks in developing nuclear weapons, increasing know-how about them, and maintaining valuable expertise. 3)
A key criterion for whether a program could be considered covert or overt was whether it involved handling of nuclear material leaving traces of radioactive contamination, which could be detected by international nuclear inspectors or foreign intelligence services. 4)
Work was judged on whether it could be explained as a peaceful application, e.g. it allowed Iran to disguise a nuclear weapons effort as a carefully sculpted civilian nuclear activity or non-nuclear military activity. 5)
Iran also focused on the portability of sensitive work, or ease of moving it quickly if needed. 6)
The archive documents show that the United States incorrectly assessed with high confidence in a 2007 declassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that “in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." 7)
Moreover, the 2007 NIE also incorrectly asserted that Iran had not re-started its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, albeit with only moderate confidence. 8)
The information in the archive evaluated so far does not answer the question of what the current status of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is. The archive’s existence and its careful maintenance strongly support that Iran at least wants to remain ready to build nuclear weapons. 9)
The question of whether Iran’s nuclear weapons program was truly halted was not settled by the time the Iran nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was implemented in early 2016. 10)
At the time, most deal advocates argued that intelligence communities had a sound understanding of how far Iran had gone in nuclear weapons development, so it did not matter that a full International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) accounting and investigation would not be done. 11)
This was a mistake, as the archives are now revealing – the United States overstated the fulsomeness of what it knew at the time of the conclusion of the JCPOA. 12)
Today, there is only partial implementation of the key verification arrangements in the JCPOA aimed at limiting Iran’s nuclear weapons work, and progress on this issue is expected to remain slow at best. 13)
Moreover, the IAEA, under its safeguards agreement with Iran, has remained, due to the lack of support from the P5+1 and its own governing bodies, unable to access relevant military sites or personnel associated with potential on-going or past nuclear weapons work. 14)
Almost three years after the implementation of the JCPOA, and with its fate at issue, there is insufficient information to settle the question of the status of Iran’s on-going work on nuclear weapons. 15)
This together with the sunset provisions in the JCPOA, and lack of any credible verification of the status and monitoring of its ballistic and cruise missile program, have kept open a pathway for Iran’s nuclear weapons capability. 16)
As a reminder, as reported in the IAEA’s December 2015 “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Iran “specifically denied the existence of the AMAD Plan." 17)
The Iranian archive documents and other body of evidence shows that the AMAD Plan did indeed exist, and that it carried on in a more careful and dispersed fashion after 2003, eventually incarnated as SPND. 18)
The burden is on Iran, and by virtue of its duties, the IAEA, to ensure verifiably that any remaining nuclear weapons programs – including the development or production of nuclear weapon components and development of delivery mechanisms, are ended in Iran. 19)
This will involve the IAEA using the information in the seized archives to expand inspections and monitoring in Iran and build a stronger public characterization of Iran’s past nuclear weapons work. 20)
It is vital for the inspectors to have full, unrestricted access to relevant Iranian technical and scientific personnel, equipment, and sites, including those at military facilities. 21)
Anything short of that undermines the credibility of the international nonproliferation regime and sets a negative precedent for future proliferant states. 22) end
