We have obtained a set of documents and photos from the atomic archive in Iran which provides the public its first look inside the Parchin nuclear weapons development facility and at the type of nuclear weapons related activities that took place at the site. 1)
This report, in particular, for the first time publicly correlates photos from inside the main building, called Taleghan 1 by Iran, to satellite imagery. 2)
This report updates previous discussion of the purpose of the second major building at the site, called Taleghan 2, and touches upon the operation of the facilities. 3)
It includes confirmation that Iran was testing in Taleghan 1 a specialized, difficult to develop, neutron initiator to start the chain reaction in a nuclear explosion. 4)
The new information about Parchin, aka Taleghan, shows that Iran conducted far more high explosive tests at the site than previously understood. 5)
Iran may have maintained some of the equipment for later use, and did in fact resume (elsewhere) some of those activities related to nuclear weapons development under a new organizational structure controlled by the Iranian military. 6)
This report is comprised of the following sections:
• New Information Seized by Israel
• Main High Explosive Test Building (AKA Taleghan 1)
• Probable High Explosive Storage Bunker
7)
• New Information Seized by Israel
• Main High Explosive Test Building (AKA Taleghan 1)
• Probable High Explosive Storage Bunker
7)
• Second High Explosive Chamber Laboratory
• Manufacture of the Large Chamber in Taleghan 1
• Subproject 3/21: Neutron Initiator Tests
• Findings and Recommendations
8)
• Manufacture of the Large Chamber in Taleghan 1
• Subproject 3/21: Neutron Initiator Tests
• Findings and Recommendations
8)
Iran's work appears to have involved more than what the IAEA called feasibility and scientific studies, or the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities, as the IAEA asserted in its December 2015 report. 9)
The information highlights dual-use, controlled equipment used at the site. It would be expected that Iran has stored this equipment for future use or assigned it to other projects. An important question is: where is it now? 10)
Unless Iran can demonstrate it has destroyed all the equipment or is not utilizing it, this photographic evidence should be sufficient to initiate an action by the Joint Commission to subject this equipment to control and monitoring under Section T of the JCPOA. 11)
Is Iran simply preserving, curating, and improving its nuclear weapons capabilities, awaiting a decision to reconstitute a full-blown nuclear weapons program at a later date, if such a political decision is made? 12)
Its failure to destroy all these documents, and purportedly, the equipment used in these activities, does not align with its commitment under the JCPOA “that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons.” 13)
Despite all the evidence, the IAEA has received mixed support from the Joint Commission in assessing the site. 14)
During JCPOA negotiations, the Obama admin decided not to insist on including resolution of Parchin and broader nuclear weapons issues as a precondition for arriving at a nuclear deal. This unwise political decision continues to haunt the entire Iran issue today. 15)
The IAEA needs access to the Parchin site and associated facilities, such as the company or companies where the high explosive chambers were manufactured, as well as individuals identified as having worked during this time period at the site. 16)
The evidence reinforces that Iran was violating the NPT in the early 2000s in a more significant manner than previously understood and fully intended at that time to continue work toward having the option to build nuclear weapons and deceive the IAEA in that endeavor. 17)
Given the length of this controversy, Iran’s obvious deceptions about its activities at this site, the advanced level of nuclear weapons development work done there, and the challenges posed by the site’s legacy, the Board of Governors bears its share of the responsibility. 18)
The E3 and United States should urge the IAEA to substantially enhance its inspections in Iran. The E3 should pursue full implementation of both the JCPOA and Section T, as it seeks to preserve the JCPOA and resist any efforts to weaken its provisions or implementation. 19)
The IAEA should more generally use the information in the seized archives to expand inspections and monitoring in Iran and build a stronger public characterization of Iran’s past nuclear weapons work. 20)
This new information, as exemplified by Parchin, inevitably leads to renewed urgency to look again at the question of whether Iran is maintaining and advancing a nuclear weapons program today using the newest organization named SPND mentioned in the IAEA reports. 21)
