It’s disappointing to see this talking point rearing its head again. 1/
Academics have been constructively engaging with the crypto backdoor problem for decades now. In the 1990s the NSA proposed a mandatory escrow proposal that was seriously flawed — academics engaged and showed it was broken. 2/
The entire episode was a disaster, and everyone — including the US government — agrees in retrospect that mandating backdoor access would have been a terrible outcome. 3/
In the current decade the US government wants the same thing. This time they’re so gunshy about the near disaster that was their last proposal, that they won’t even make any suggestions. 4/
So the new talking point is “it’s not our job”, let’s get the eggheads to figure it out. If they can’t make it work, it must be because of their politics. 5/
But eventually some well-known researchers did come forward and make proposals. Unsurprisingly, those proposals were effectively new variations on past key escrow proposals. Researchers engaged and pointed out the risks. 6/
Papers were published on the subject in our top academic computer security conferences. cseweb.ucsd.edu/~savage/papers…
And after all that, nobody has found a proposal that anyone really feels comfortable with. So we’re still being told that the reason we can’t build crypto backdoors in some new way is because we’re being ideologues. 8/
Alright, maybe we are being stubborn. But that’s because we keep seeing the same proposal over and over again. When someone proposes an idea that might resist abuse by criminals, law enforcement has an objection (too slow, too expensive, might reveal info about investigations.)
All of which are valid objections on their part! But also help to explain why the problem is so hard. It’s not failure to engage. It’s like trying to build a popcorn maker when you can’t have popcorn, heat, or electricity. 10/10
Oh gosh. And a reminder: this debate isn’t just about people getting into phones. GCHQ has some thoughts on adding themselves to our chats and phone calls too. lawfareblog.com/principles-mor… 
