One of the odder bits of the U.K. constitution - as this piece by @ChrisLeslieMP shows - is that the House of Commons doesn’t control its own timetable.
This usually doesn’t matter - since the majority of the House usually supports the Government and its legislative priorities. Indeed, most courses on constitutional law don’t even bother looking at Commons Standing Orders which give the Government its control of the timetable.
But where there is not just a minority government, but a government whose policy priority is actively opposed by a HoC majority, those usually obscure Orders suddenly become both important and controversial.
And it also suddenly becomes important to find recherché ways in which the HoC can impose its will on a recalcitrant executive - eg, as the article points out, by refusing supply or cutting ministers’ salaries.
A combination of Brexit and the Fixed Term Parliaments Act is making UK constitutional law more exciting than it has been for many years.
