Thread by @themarketswork

1) My latest @EpochTimes - FBI Testimonies on Carter Page FISA Reveal Broken Oversight Process

theepochtimes.com/fbi-testimonie…

2) The FBI began to set their sights on Carter Page in the summer of 2016.

Asked how he first gained knowledge of the FBI’s intention to pursue a FISA on Page, Baker testified it came through his familiarity with the FBI’s investigation:

"I am talking about 2016 in the summer"

3) The FISA process is generally viewed as one that typically takes months of preparation before an application is actually presented to the FISA court, but according to Baker the process could move very quickly - and could even be done orally if needed.

4)FISA warrants are used to obtain foreign intelligence, but as Baker testified, FISAs can have a criminal component to them as well—as long as a high-ranking national security official signs off that a significant purpose of the FISA application is to obtain foreign intelligence

5) Anderson described the FISA application process as being a linear path and noted there is a specific “system called FISAMS within the FBI that tracks in a linear fashion all the approvals on a FISA.”

6) Despite the rigid description provided by Baker and Anderson, it appears the linearity process was not adhered to in the case of the Page FISA.
cc: @carterwpage

7) According to Anderson, pre-approvals for the Page FISA were provided from both Deputy FBI Director Andrew McCabe and Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates, before the FISA application was ever presented to her for review.

8) The unusual preliminary review and approval from both McCabe and Yates appears to have had a substantial impact on the normal review process.

It is not known why McCabe and Yates both chose to insert themselves at an early stage into the Page FISA process.

9) Anderson viewed the situation as particularly unique, noting that “I wouldn't view it as my role to second-guess that substantive approval that had already been given by the Deputy Director and by the Deputy Attorney General in this particular instance.”

10) Anderson also testified that she had not read the Page FISA prior to signing off on the application and passing it along to FBI Director Comey for final signature.

11) Anderson testified that the Director might receive 15-20 FISAs to sign each day that contained large amounts of documentation:

She also said the FBI Director was allotted 20 minutes in which to review the entirety of the day’s FISA applications - not 20 minutes per FISA.

12) Anderson told investigators that FBI General Counsel James Baker had personally read and reviewed the Page FISA.

According to Baker, he had only read the “factual section” relating to probable cause, and had not read or reviewed any other section, including the Woods file.

13) Baker testified that the political motivations of dossier author, Christopher Steele, should have been vetted during lower levels of preparation and disclosed to the FISA court.

14) FBI lawyer, Sally Moyer, told lawmakers that only the originating agent and the supervisory special agent in the field actually look at the Woods file during the preparation of a FISA application.

15) Moyer told investigators that “the person that's signing the application is relying on the individuals who have signed the Woods form that they have the Woods file.”

Moyer said the FBI HQ SSA might choose to review the Woods file, but that was not done with the Page FISA.

16) Moyer said that routine compliance audits-accuracy reviews-are sometimes carried out by the DOJ’s Office of Intelligence that would entail review of non-specific Woods files.

Moyer said that the Woods file relating to the Page FISA had not been reviewed or audited by anyone.

17) Baker himself was unaware of some material facts.

When told that Bruce Ohr—who passed information from Steele & Simpson to the FBI—had informed the FBI that there was the potential for bias, Baker told investigators:

“I don't recall ever hearing that before just right now.”

18) Meanwhile, Moyer testified that without the Steele dossier, the Page FISA would have had a 50/50 chance of achieving the probable cause standard before the FISA court.

Notably, to this day the Steele dossier remains unverified by the FBI.

19) Baker understood the sensitivity of the Page FISA, saying he envisioned an interview like the one he was involved in.

However, Baker did not review any of the 3 renewals, telling investigators, “the machinery was moving and the renewals they had expiration dates and so on.”

20) There is one final check in the FISA application process—the FISA Court itself.

A federal judge who would hear the FBI and DOJ arguments, questioning the process and the underlying evidence.

Except that never happened, and apparently it rarely does.

21) In response to a FOIA lawsuit by Judicial Watch, the DOJ acknowledged that no hearings were held in regards to the Page FISA.

The DOJ also noted that according to experts at the DOJ’s Office of Intelligence, this “is typical in proceedings before the FISC.”

22) In a July 2013, response letter to Sen. Leahy, presiding FISC Judge Reggie B. Walton provided a description of FISA court practices:

“These courses of action might include...determining that a hearing would be appropriate before deciding whether to grant the application.”

23) According to the practices sent by Judge Walton, the government can also request a hearing:

“In conjunction with its submission of a final application, the government has an opportunity to request a hearing, even if the judge did not otherwise intend to require one.”

24) The Page FISA application was not just another run-of-the-mill surveillance warrant placed before the court by the intelligence community.

Page had been a foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign in the midst of a presidential election.

25) As can be seen from the example of the Page FISA, the intent behind the process appears to have been subsumed by the process itself, relegating the various levels of oversight to a glorified process of rubber-stamps.

The FISA Court appears to have performed little better.

26) A damning 99-page April 26, 2017 unsealed FISA Court Ruling issued by presiding FISA court Judge Rosemary Collyer provided further insight into additional FISA abuse engaged in by the intelligence community in relation to Section 702 data and minimization procedures.

27) The FISA court found that the government had been engaging in a long pattern of significant abuses that were revealed to the court by then-NSA Director Admiral Mike Rogers.
dni.gov/files/document…

28) "...significant non-compliance with the NSA’s minimization procedures involving queries of data acquired under Section 702 using U.S. person identifiers. The full scope of non-compliant querying practices had not been previously disclosed to the Court,”

29) The court noted the government's failure to previously notify the court of these issues, referring to the government’s actions as exhibiting an institutional “lack of candor” while emphasizing that “this is a very serious Fourth Amendment issue.”

30) The ruling detailed the FBI's use of private contractors:

"[Redacted] contractors had access to raw FISA information that went well beyond what was necessary to respond to the FBI’s requests."

31) Cont:

"restrictions were not in place with regard to the [Redacted] contractors: their access was not limited to raw information for which the FBI sought assistance and access continued even after they had completed work in response to an FBI request."

32) The FBI was singled out by the FISA court numerous times:

“The Court is nonetheless concerned about the FBI’s apparent disregard of minimization rules and whether the FBI may be engaging in similar disclosures of raw Section 702 information that have not been reported.”

33) More information can be found here:

themarketswork.com/2018/04/05/the…

34) The FISA process has been the subject of ongoing abuse from various elements within the intelligence community and the processes and procedures that we have been told would protect us appear to be routinely compromised at will.

35) As a result of the April ‘17 FISA Court ruling, changes to the FISA process have been made.

Nevertheless, a complete re-examination of the entire FISA system appears to be not only warranted, but perhaps necessary.

/End