Thread by @s13GES

I have been inspired by this very long thread and was wondering whether it is actually worth it to make a similar thread on Germany. To do so it will require a bit of context but also awareness that GER EU policy is rather long term than shaped by short term events.

https://twitter.com/Sime0nStylites/status/1120310623085170688

So where to start? Best possible way is where outsiders normally have a go: The refugee crisis and Euro crisis. Those events had an impact on Germany's EU policy but not in the same way as UK commenters usually suspect.

First and foremost: The Greece and Euro crisis may have been interpreted as exposing the flaws of the Euro, but there have been no serious calls for leaving the Euro and no public support in polls. The German position on Euro has been, that not following the rules...

... and being lenient has caused this problem: Ergo, rules must be even stricter followed and systemic exceptions not longer granted. This may have informed the very uncompromising stance from GER major parties and the public on Brexit.

No exceptions for UK on on FoM, out means out - but completely. That doesn't mean that exceptions are generally not possible, but seen through a very suspicious eye. Exceptions where they are needed and necessary, but not from the perspective of the member state but from EU.

Which leads us to a precursor of the referendum campaign: The refugee crisis. Reading the German news coverage and speeches of key politicians several things should be noted.

1) There is a clear distinction between inner EU migration and migration from outside EU. Latter was never questioned, but the former was seen as a problem.

2) What has been questioned was Schengen, which has little to do with four freedoms. However, this questioning has been temporarily at best and was accompanied by pressure on border states and bordering third countries. Schengen was seen through the lense of economics and trade.

3) Asylum and European Asylum system became a thing. Germany was traditionally opposing it, fearing that it would carry the cost. The events brought them to the conclusion that coordination was key - which essentially means more Europe and not less. This notion has been shared...

... not just by politicians but also in public.

There are other points to consider in order to get Germany's EU policy: Germany is rather following continuity and long term goals which are shared by most parties. AfD and to some extend Linke are exceptions.

Both parties may not share all goals or just very few of them, but they struggle to get more than 25% support by the public and especially Linke is very diverse on that matter. In any case, the reason why common ground is dominant in EU policy is easy to explain.

1) SPD & CDU/CSU don't want to p*ss of future coalition partners.
2) Ratification processes may need Bundesrat approval which means three or four parties need to agree and not just CDU/CSU and SPD.
3) Most parties are pro-EU & at best mildly Eurosceptic (e.g. some parts of FDP).

4) Nearly all parties see EU as an instrument of power: economically but also culturally and geopolitical. There is no appetite to weaken it and in the German public the notion of 'besser mit dem Teufel den du kennst' is very strong. It's a necessary evil, not more but not less.

So this lead quite quickly to two major positions on Brexit:
1) EU's constitution must not be harmed regardless the costs (no exception on FoM).
2) EU membership must be worth it (no soft line on Irish border, Irish interest have primacy as long as No 1 is not harmed).

There has been, this must be mentioned at this point, some dissent on FoM with regards to future offers to EU-UK relationship. Roettgen was e.g. contemplating about it. But it didn't go down well, neither appetite in public nor among political or economic elites.

Hence the last GE has been little surprising. AfD won seats but remained marginal with no direct influence and at best with little indirect influence (and even this is limited but it would go too far to explain this in detail).

Actually, the raise of Greens has been way more remarkable, which kind of offsets CDU's shift to the right (they remain pretty much centre or in the realm of liberal conservatism btw). This trend has been mirrored by AKK's victory over Merz and Spahn.

Even though late moves by AKK (for those who don't know, it's the acronym for the current party leader of CDU) indicate some shifts in migration policy to facilitate the right wing, those policy shifts are limited and pretty much dependent on whether Greens or SPD allow them.

Little hint: no chances for real policy shifts here either. What you can see however, is a growing anger on UK's position. Not agreeing to a deal which is pretty much perceived as well too soft while being demanding and portraying EU & GER as evil doesn't go down well.

So if you currently go through GER media you will find pretty dark humor and slight contempt towards UK's EU policy.

Obviously this is not chronographic, but I hope a good summary of GER's EU position. It's characterised by continuity, not by flexibility on basics. It's shaped by consent & backed by public. However, Brexit is not a major concern in the public or political debate.

If you are interested on GER politics, you may want to follow @APHClarkson but also @HeleneBismarck who could probably say more about GER's relationship to UK. @odtorson also posts occasionally something on GER, @stefwalter__ did some research on GER perception of Brexit.

@HzBrandenburg and @hhesterm are also worth following by the way. Even though it's mostly on UK rather than GER policy.