Thread by @JohnOBrennan2

A thread on the EU & the Western Balkans. On Tuesday the EU’s General Affairs Council in Luxembourg will discuss opening accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia and consider the European Commission’s recent evaluation of progress by Western Balkan states 1/

Membership of the EU remains the goal of all 6 WB states but I argue that they have had to contend with an enlargement process which “has been on ‘life support’ for many years, moving towards an increasingly uncertain destination” 2/
iiea.com/publication/ii…

The European Commission has recommended that accession talks be opened with Albania and North Macedonia. Why?
Because the Commission argues both countries have met the criteria for progress laid down by the EU. 3/
ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-…

This comes one year after the EU postponed a decision on both countries being elevated and after an emphatic commitment on the EU's part that, if the criteria were met, talks should open.
4/

The conclusions of the June 2018 Council implied that both Albania and North Macedonia would be given the green light to open accession talks in June 2019. 5/
consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/ga…

The EU has behaved appallingly throughout this whole sorry saga. Or to be more accurate, some member states - principally France & the Netherlands - have behaved appallingly, by seeking at to block or hinder any Western Balkan state from making progress in negotiations. 6/

Each EU state has a veto on accessions to the EU and progress can’t be made while there remain blockages in the Council. The Commission manages the process on a day to day basis but the member states remain in control of decision-making. 7/

The EU has a long and sorry history with the Balkans. In 1991 while Yugoslavia was falling apart, Jacques Poos, foreign minister of Luxembourg, declared that “this is the hour of Europe”. It wasn’t of course. 8/

Within weeks Serb guns were bombing the beautiful town of Vukovar, setting in train a deadly series of wars which brought the ghastly term “ethnic cleansing” into our lexicon. 9/
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of…

The Netherlands holds a special responsibility here. After all it was Dutch soldiers (acting as UN peacekeepers) that stood by in July 1995 as Ratko Mladić’s murderous thugs carried off upwards of 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys to be slaughtered. 10/
theguardian.com/world/2017/jun…

In June 2003 at the Thessaloniki European Council, the EU provided: “its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries” and said “the future of the Western Balkans is in the European Union”. 11/

That seemingly emphatic statement was made almost 19 years ago to the day.
Only Croatia has managed to extricate itself from the vacuum of non-membership since then. 12/
europa.eu/rapid/press-re…

The research evidence suggests a clear link between the credibility and seriousness of the EU promise to accession hopefuls and the measure of progress those states make in meeting EU criteria for membership. If these states believe the EU is serious, that encourages reforms. 13/

So there is a symbiotic link between the “us” and the “future us” as Commission specialist Graham Avery once put it. 14/

If however, outside states don’t believe the EU will deliver on its commitments, that slows or potentially derails the momentum behind EU-linked reform processes. President Juncker made it clear in 2014 that there would be no further accessions to the Union during 2014-19. 15/

At a stroke Juncker removed any incentive that reform-minded elites in Western Balkan states might have had for reform. 16/
neweurope.eu/article/juncke…

It is President Macron, however,who has emerged as the most important opponent of further enlargement. In 2018 he warned against any “hasty enlargement”.
This 15 years AFTER the EU made a solemn promise to Western Balkan states at Thessaloniki. 17/
ft.com/content/c09472…

The sense of betrayal in the Western Balkans must be palpable, especially, as Politico reports, France and Germany have even taken issue with the phrase “The Council welcomes” in the text under discussion. 18/

Fr/GER take issue with the Commission’s recommendation to begin membership talks and insist the phrase "the Council welcomes" be replaced with the much more prosaic “the Council takes note”. 19/
politico.eu/article/north-…

The German position on further enlargement has been schizophrenic. Berlin has generally been more favourable to enlargement than Paris, but is now increasingly reticent mainly because of increasing domestic currents of ‘nativism’ and anti-foreigner sentiment. 20/

Germany’s support for the opening of talks requires support of the Bundestag but this has not as yet been forthcoming. 21/

German MPs claim that they have not had sufficient time to study the Commission’s assessment of North Macedonia’s progress. But this is simply not a tenable explanation. 22/
balkaninsight.com/2019/06/07/ger…

The French, at least are nothing if not consistent. In the 1960s they were absolutely opposed to UK & Ireland joining. In the 1990s, they opposed the Eastern enlargement, fearing a reduction in CAP subsidies in particular as well as a dilution of French influence in the EU. 23/

The stasis in the negotiations is particularly tragic for North Macedonia.
PM Zoren Zaev & his government have taken enormous risks in changing the name of their country,& more generally, pursuing a reform agenda completely congruent with EU demands. 24/
politico.eu/article/north-…

The transposition of EU rules is financially costly& carries significant danger of electoral punishment. Where Zaev and his colleagues have taken steps to move closer to the EU, to now be rejected or told that talks MIGHT be opened at later date, would be a kick in the teeth. 25/

Politics – like nature – abhors a vacuum.
While the EU dithers, radical Macedonian nationalists and Russian operatives will seek to exploit the unease of North Macedonia’s citizens. China and Turkey, similarly are already moving into the spaces created by the EU’s absence. 26/

Meanwhile, across Western Balkan capitals, the lesson learned will be that you can take significant domestic risks to move closer to the EU but these will not necessarily be rewarded by Brussels. 27/

Why bother?
Better to continue stoking ethno-nationalist sentiments and getting rich through illicit deal-making with the local variants of the region’s criminal ecosystem. 28/

The EU’s failure to follow-up adequately on the promise made to the region at Thessaloniki is often attributed to a protracted mood of so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’ among the member states. 29/

This refers to the sense that, in taking in 12 new states between 2004 and 2007 (and one more in 2013), the EU had expanded too far and could not cope with any additional new entrants. 30/
iiea.com/publication/ii…

France, in particular, suggests that the EU must have the requisite ‘absorption capacity’ before it can accept more members. By this is meant that the EU must reform itself in advance of new accessions. 31/

Or at least that further accession does not impede the impetus towards further deepening of European integration. 32/
politico.eu/article/north-…

But the French insistence on EU internal reform is not accompanied by specific recommendations for achieving such reform. It is commonly thought, however, that ‘absorption capacity’ refers to the capacity of the Council to transact EU business in an efficient manner. 33/

How to do that in moving from 27 to 33 member states? Some suspect that invoking 'absorption capacity' is merely a ruse by member states to delay or prevent a specific country or group of countries from joining the EU 34/

In fact most of the evidence over the last two decades suggests that the increase in membership of the Council did not slow down or otherwise impair the EU’s capacity to agree on legislation or take decisions. 35/

Jean Claude Juncker has admitted such in recent public comments.
There is no evidence that the accession of 13 new states over the past 15 years has slowed down the EU legislative track or hindered the search for consensus on specific issues.
36/
euractiv.com/section/enlarg…

‘Enlargement fatigue to some degree now also revolves around retrospective doubts about the EU’s alleged ‘transformative effect’ on applicant states and the sense that Bulgaria and Romania were not ready for membership and should not have been accepted in 2007. 37/

The serious patterns of democratic ‘backsliding’ and 'autocracy building' in Hungary and Poland adds an impulse toward renewed caution about further accessions. 38/
rte.ie/brainstorm/201…

IMO, the rule of law problems experienced within the EU stem from the unwillingness of both Commission & Council to face up to the pathologies within their midst, beginning after Viktor Orban’s return to power in 2010, accelerating in 2015 and return of PiS in Warsaw. 39/

Commission should have been proactive in using infringement procedures against Hun & Pol at earlier stage & EPP should have kicked Fidesz out of its ranks when it became clear that Viktor Orban was succeeding in ambition to create a full-blown autocracy from within the EU. 40/

The answer to the problem of ‘democratic backsliding’ within the EU is NOT to think of past enlargements as a mistake but rather to focus on and correct the deficiencies of existing EU rule of law mechanisms & unwillingness of EU actors to move against would-be tyrants. 41/

Commission, Council and individual member states should pay attention to the trenchant critiques by EU rule of law specialists, incl. @rdanielkelemen @ProfPech Kim Lane Scheppele and others. Many excellent ideas here: verfassungsblog.de/category/debat… 42/

Think about it. Had the EU postponed the decision to enlarge in 2004 to, say, 2008, does anybody believe it would have happened at all? The financial crisis would have put paid to any talk of adding to the EU’s membership. 43/

We would now have a vast new ‘Iron Curtain’ down Central Europe, analogous to the dreadful ‘buffer zones’ of Europe’s past. The only beneficiary from that geopolitical impasse would have been Russia.
The historic 'Return to Europe' by CEE states would never have happened. 44/

The EU can go some way to correcting its existing rule of law problems by:
(1) a willingness to use more infringement procedures against transgressing member states;
(2) being more vigorous in pursuing Article 7 procedures against transgressing states. 45/

(3) introduce new annual rule of law evaluation procedure to examine how each member state (yes all 27) complies with its obligations under the Treaties& especially with the values codified in Article 2 TEU.
A 'Copenhagen Commission' (named after the 'Copenhagen Criteria') 46/

(4) Establishing a concrete link between rule of law performance @ dispersal of EU budgetary subvention (especially structural funds). Material sanctions must be part of the formula to reduce the incentive for ruling elites to attack pluralist institutions. 47/.

W Balkans remains most fragile part of Europe. Corruption goes hand in hand with authoritarian impulses to undermine EU enlargement objectives. Ethno-National tensions remain significant. Uneasiness about Serbia-Kosovo dialogue and prospect of land/population swap continues. 48/

The objective of EU policy towards the Western Balkans should be to use the accession process to promote and police an accelerated ‘Europeanisation’ strategy for the region, designed to secure membership of the European Union for all states in the region. 49/

EU 'backsliding' on commitment made at Thessaloniki is a stain upon the efforts of all those who have fought to unite Europe peacefully, including the considerable efforts of so many people across the W Balkans. We need to support them and better understand their challenges. 50/

EU cannot continue kicking the can down the road, hoping the region avoids an even deeper malaise.The weakening of the ‘EU anchor’ precipitates weaker pursuit of enlargement reforms. It is thus self-defeating for the EU- drift becomes the default condition of EU-WB relations 51/

The sense of drift is now palpable & reflected in continuing flow of people out of region. People simply cannot see a future for themselves 'outside Europe'.
If North Macedonia is deemed unworthy of promotion after such strenuous efforts, what hope for Bosnia or Kosovo? 52/ ENDS