Thread by @ProfPaulPoast

Trump is right: 🇺🇸 didn't agree to protect the Kurds indefinitely.

But what are the implications of abandoning the Kurds now? Specifically, will this damage broader 🇺🇸 alliance relations?

[THREAD]

washingtonpost.com/video/politics…

ON THE ONE HAND, @mephenke in @monkeycageblog argues that abandoning the Kurds will damage US credibility with allies, possibly complicating our ability to maintain current alliances and form future alliances

washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/…

There is sound IR literature backing up this claim. Notably, a number of scholars explore how a "reputation" for being a reliable ally influences the ability of a state to acquire allies.

These works include...

...@mark_crescenzi & co-authors in @ISQ_Jrnl

academic.oup.com/isq/article-ab…

...@dmgibler in Journal of Conflict Resolution

journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…

...Gregory Miller in a @CornellPress book

books.google.com/books?id=RONmD…

All of this work builds on the broader notions of states seeking and protecting "reputation" and "credibility" in international politics. @ProfLupton summarized some of the most recent books on this topic 👇

https://twitter.com/ProfLupton/status/1135569172530978817

And the reputation literature is part of the specific literature on "audience costs" -- the idea that leaders are punished for a mismatch between "words" and "deeds" (something that has been brought up before with Trump)

https://twitter.com/ProfPaulPoast/status/1134422125798989825

Indeed, the idea of "audiences cost" was developed by Thomas Schelling in the context of thinking about alliance reliability

google.com/books/edition/…

Here is the passage:

This is why "audience costs" are viewed by James Fearon (in his 1997 JCR piece) as a key way of making alliance commitments credible

journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00…

Here is the key passage from Fearon:

ON THE OTHER HAND, there are reasons to doubt that abandoning the Kurds will harm US reputation for alliance credibility.

First, when it comes specifically to the Kurds, the US already had a terrible reputation for supporting them, as described in this recent @ForeignPolicy piece

foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/14/us-…

Second, since 🇺🇸 is pursuing a policy that 🇹🇷 wants, you could argue that this is a case where a formal (i.e. written treaty) alliance with a sovereign state "TRUMPS" an informal (i.e. unwritten) ad-hoc arrangement with a non-state actor.

After all, 🇹🇷 is a @NATO ally.

Third, there are reasons to think that reputation doesn't play much of a role in alliance formation.

In a recent @TWQgw piece, @ALanoszka makes the point that beliefs about a state's alliance credibility are "situation specific" and is influenced by local factors

https://twitter.com/ALanoszka/status/1185238415748587520

This relates to a more general point made by James Morrow in a 1994 JCR piece

journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00…

Morrow makes the point that circumstances change from case to case (consistent with @ALanoszka)

https://twitter.com/ProfPaulPoast/status/1146021013316132864

Also, as this recent @JPR_journal piece shows, if a state is really concerned about a prospective ally's "reliability reputation", that state will "compensate" by diversifying its "alliance portfolio"

journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…

Fourth, there are reasons to think that concerns about reputation and credibility don't really drive decision making in foreign policy.

This was famously put forward by @BarackObama in an interview w/ @JeffreyGoldberg for @TheAtlantic : “dropping bombs on someone to prove that you’re willing to drop bombs on someone is just about the worst reason to use force.”

theatlantic.com/magazine/archi…

There is IR research backing up that claim, as @zackbeauchamp summarized for @voxdotcom

vox.com/2016/3/10/1119…

An interesting caveat is put offered by @ShipingTang in this @SecStudies_Jrnl: a "cult of reputation" can compell leaders to *think* that reputation matters, even though other states don't actually care.

tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

So, will abandoning the Kurds hurt the US "alliance reputation"?

For me, the evidence comes down on the side of "no", but there are good arguments on both sides of this issue.

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