I almost always agree with Robin Wright, but I disagree that Reagan was wrong to withdraw from Lebanon in 1983 or that the US is wrong to withdraw from Syria now.
"The 1983 Beirut Barracks Bombing, and the Current U.S. Retreat from Syria" - by @wrightr newyorker.com/news/our-colum…
"The 1983 Beirut Barracks Bombing, and the Current U.S. Retreat from Syria" - by @wrightr newyorker.com/news/our-colum…
1. The US mistake in Lebanon was not Reagan's refusal to remain & fight Hezbollah after 1983, but to team buy into the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Israel's ambition to destroy the PLO & return Lebanon to Maronite rule was not something the US should have signed onto. 
2. The US's mistake in Syria was to arm the Syrian militias. The US could not adjudicate the Syrian civil war any more than it could Lebanon's. 8 years later, the result is failure and a Syria that is much more damaged than it would have been had the US stayed out.
3. Trump was correct not to promise the Kurds a quasi-state. Staying in Syria for the "long-haul," as Special Envoy James Jeffrey intended, was a fool's errand. The US cannot hope to expel Iran from Syria, just as It cannot deliver on an independent entity for Syria's Kurds.
Syria's Kurds number only 2 million. NE Syria is the most under-developed region of Syria. The US notion of building it into a separate state is crazy. Most importantly, the Kurds do not have an air force; they will be overwhelmed as soon as the US withdraws. The Kurds need Damas
4. The US's effort, along with that of TR, KSA, Qatar, et. al., to arm the Syrian militias led to the empowerment of al-Qaida & ISIS, just as the US occupation of Iraq did - just as Israel's occupation of Lebanon led to the emergence of Hezbollah.
5. Yes, the Assad regime misruled Syria, is narrow, corrupt and depends on a minoritarian strategy, but arming the Sunni insurgency led to sectarian extremism & intern'l escalation, just as Israel's arming of Al-Kata'ib led to sectarian extremism & intern'l escalation in Lebanon.
6. Neither Israel's strategy of destroying the PLO in Lebanon, nor the US's strategy of destroying the Assad regime in Syria were winning strategies. They made bad situations worse, fueled instability & extremism.
7. ISIS does not have to "return" in Syria. The only viable long-term solution to ensuring the defeat of ISIS in Syria is to assist the return of central authority to the region. As Amb. Crocker said: “Extremists groups move into ungoverned spaces.”
8. Russia, the YPG, and Damascus are trying to restore a return of government in N.E. Syria in the wake of the US pull out. All are enemies of ISIS. It is incumbent on the US, now that it has withdrawn, to support their coordination & anti-ISIS efforts.
9. Iran and Russia are rivals of the US, but any effort by Washington to undermine their efforts to bring stability to NE Syria will only help ISIS & extremist groups. If the US keeps troops in the area, takes oil wells, or resists the transition of authority, it will serve ISIS.
10. The way the US withdrew from NE Syria was damaging, but the principle of withdrawal was correct, as was the principle of withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983. The real mistake was believing that the US could solve regional ethnic & religious disputes with military occupation.
