Good piece analyzing a recent Russian influence operation targeting Madagascar. The operation is linked to online assets we removed (and Stanford analyzed and helped expose) several weeks ago, but it's broader than that, and rife with incompetence. /thread nytimes.com/2019/11/11/wor…
Here's our takedown of the online operation: newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/10/r…
And here's Stanford's analysis (courtesy of @shelbygrossman, @alexstamos, and @noUpside): cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/prigoz…
Three esp useful insights in the @nytimes write-up: (1) The operation was much broader than social media -- it involved operatives on the ground, direct support of candidates, and even a local newspaper. This is why collab btwn gov't, industry, and civil society is critical.
(2) An op like this would be much more difficult in the US, where we have dedicated law enforcement focused on these threats. In fact, we've seen that acct verification can force operations to rely on locals, thereby exposing them to local LE -- but only where gov't is vigilant.
(3) The operation was *sloppy.* These actors want to convey an air of evil genius, but often they fall far short. It's critical that we all take this threat seriously, but we also shouldn't give these actors more credit than they are due.
All of this together demonstrates how important it is to have industry, civil society, and government working together to tackle these threats. I'm encouraged that we have that here in the US, and we're working actively to build those efforts around the world.
Thoughtful analysis of these operations in the media is also critical (ty, @nytimes!) -- it exposes the threat without hyperbolizing it or playing into the bad guys' hands. There's another good writeup analyzing the implications in @washingtonpost: (/fin) washingtonpost.com/opinions/russi…
