Bought Shuja Nawaz's "The Battle for Pakistan" from Liberty Books to figure out what the army found so threatening that it banned the book launch in Pakistan.
Sharing some of his ideas in a thread:
1. US should push for an integrated Greater South Asia as counterweight to China
Sharing some of his ideas in a thread:
1. US should push for an integrated Greater South Asia as counterweight to China
2. He looks to Imran Khan with hope, & blames the US for "mollycoddling the corrupt civilian leadership" (xxxvi) of Pakistan, which should have put him in the military establishment's good graces...but apparently even this much debate was too threatening.
3. OK, seeing reason for alarm. Nawaz doesn't "support the military as a substitute for civil government" or its "politicization." He wants to provide "constructive criticism" so that Pakistan's narrative can be based on a "verifiable reality."
Phir ISPR dramoN ka kya ho ga? 🧐
Phir ISPR dramoN ka kya ho ga? 🧐
4. Nawaz says that General Musharraf didn't want Benazir to return before the elections and the poor security provided to her in Karachi was a way of "signalling his displeasure with her."
5. President George W. Bush and Arab royals agreed on Musharraf leaving Pakistan with "protocol" and "property." The Saudi King gave General Musharraf $2 million and ruler of Abu Dhabi another $2 million, with which he bought apartments in Dubai and London. (p. 16)
6. Re Abbottabad Comm Report: "Commission also exposed the lack of development & growth of strategic thinking among the military, especially in the formulation of a current & effective defence policy. No wonder that the leak of the initial draft..led to the sealing of its work.."
7. Nawaz notes that before the journalist Saleem Shahzad was murdered (his body "badly tortured"), he was approached by intelligence officials & asked to retract a story on OBL's movement within Pakistan. Cites Dexter Filkins, "The Journalist & the Spies," New Yorker, 19/9/2011.
8. FATA: "in the rush to do the bidding of his newly rediscovered allies..Musharraf..moved regular army units that were posted...near western border into FATA...Most of these units & formations had little operational knowledge of the frontier terrain or language & customs" (293)
8. FATA: "As late as 2010, when I visited North Waziristan, the 7 Division officer...who had been there for 2 years by then, admitted to knowing no Pashto...Rather than preparing & deploying those Pashto-speaking formations, the contiguous forces from Peshawar, Bannu, Kohat, etc"
8. FATA: "...were pushed into FATA with an unclear mission. They found themselves, as had their predecessors in East Pakistan in 1971, as strangers in their own homeland." (294)
Mentioned earlier: "The army had numerous regiments that had 50 per cent Pakhtun complement and whose officers were expected to learn Pashto and were given allowances for the extra language skill." (294)
But these weren't deployed. Instead, contiguous forces were sent to FATA.
But these weren't deployed. Instead, contiguous forces were sent to FATA.
9. Internal dynamics: "Officers who came up with unusual solutions & ideas found themselves discarded in the promotion process. Extended martial law also meant that there was little turnover in the uppermost ranks, leading to the promotion of favourites & creation of clones" 296
9. Internal dynamics: "Extended military rule fostered the formation of closed kinship networks of officers who had served with each other or belonged to..same..groups. Group-think took root & prevented the kind of massive transformation..that was needed to cope with new warfare"
